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I. SUMMARY
A. The Issue
Brown v. Allen1 has long been the focus of an intense controversy in the history of habeas corpus. Beginning from a common agreement that the published opinion borders on the incomprehensible, some scholars-in a view that some current
Justices accept-argue that the case revolutionized the ability of
the federal courts to examine the constitutionality of state criminal convictions,2 while others assert with equal fervor that the

1.
2.

344 U.S. 443 (1953).
E.g., LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 421

(2000); Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 933 (1998); Katy J. Harriger, The Federalism Debate in the
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decision "worked no revolution when it recognized the
cognizability on habeas corpus of all federal constitutional
claims presented by state prisoners."'
Both sides are motivated by unabashedly contemporary
concerns: Those arguing for Brown as revolutionary seek to
undermine the legitimacy of searching federal habeas corpus
review of state criminal convictions by portraying the practice as
a recent innovation, while their opponents wish to demonstrate
the contrary.
B. The Background:Professor Bator Megts
Dr. Rorshach
When the Justices released Brown, "[m]ore than 40,000
words and six separate documents were required to set forth
their concurrences, dissents and separate opinions."4 This kaleidoscopic production received withering reviews. A commentator
in the journal of the Philadelphia Bar Association mourned that
"that peerless wit, Mr. Dooley (Finley Peter Dunne)" was no
longer on the scene to do full justice to the case and described
"the number and length of opinions filed, the uncertainty as to
the result, and the confusing alignment of the Justices" as follows:
Mr. Justice Reed announced the judgment of the Court. He
also handed down a 15,000-word opinion covering two-or is it
three?-principal points of law. On the first point (namely, what
consideration should lower courts give io a denial of certiorari by
the Supreme Court), his opinion states that it is not the opinion
of the Court. As far as anyone outside the Court can tell, one of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's two opinions in the case reflects the
Court judgment and reasoning on this first point (although there
is a vocal, even if not too clearly identified, minority).
Transformation of Federal Habeas Corpus Law, 27 PUBLIUS 1, 3 (1997); see also

infra notes 9, 28 (discussing views of Justices).
3. 1 JAMES S.LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTz, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTIcE &
PROC. § 2.4d, at 61 (2d ed. 1994). See generally Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 476
n.9 (1976) ("There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the result
in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision in Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 (1923).").
4. Luther A. Huston, Suit on Juries Won by North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 1953, at 17.
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On the other points, Mr. Justice Reed wrote-or at least so it
seems-for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justice Minton, without reservation (excepting of course those stated or implied in the
opinion itself). Mr. Justice Reed's judgment suited Mr. Justice
Jackson, but the Reed opinion did not, so there is a Jackson opinion concurring in the judgment only. Mr. Justice Burton and Mr.
Justice Clark joined in the judgment of the Court, but not in the
Reed opinion in its entirety-in fact, they seem to adhere to one
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinions, at least on the first point of
law. They did not, however, join Mr. Justice Frankfurter's second
opinion (apparently dissenting on the merits), but that opinion
was joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas.
Of course, Mr. Justice Black also wrote a dissent on the merits, and Mr. Justice Douglas joined in the Black opinion too. This
accounts for all the writing in the case, except that one of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's opinions has a voluminous Appendix, which
seems to speak only for him.
[C]omment, in legal circles and elsewhere, has been...
biting.
[T]here does not now seem to be any sound basis for hope
that the real 'last word' is any closer than it was in Mr. Dooley's
day.
That evaluation would seem to be the sensible response to a
fragmented decision.
Considering, moreover, that all relief was denied to the
state prisoners before the Court-even though each of the petitioners whose case eventually received plenary consideration
had been sentenced to death and presented very sympathetic
claims on the meritss-the decision would seem on its face most

5. James M. Marsh, The "Supreme Court": Mr. Dooley Should Take Another
Look, 16 THE SHINGLE 179-80, 184 (1953). See Woe for the Lawyers, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 13, 1953, at 6 ("There may be a 'rule of law' in those cases but the lawyers
are going to be busy as little moles digging it out ....
Where [all the writing]
leaves the learned counsels and their clients, we don't know. It left us confused.");
see also MARY FRANCES BERRY, STABILITY, SECURITY AND CONTINUITY 115 (1978)
("The final decision gave little additional guidance to the bench and bar.").
6. In one of the cases before the Court, the petitioner proved to be insane, see
infra text accompanying note 283, while the three other cases displayed some of the
worst features of Southern justice, see infra text accompanying notes 86-89, 95-99,
106-11; note 101. See generally Eric M. Freedman, Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital
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unlikely to represent a fundamental change of law in favor of
more intrusive federal habeas corpus review of state criminal
convictions.
But, as Justice Douglas later commented, the Brown "opinions were so long, and so discursive that one could find in them
what he was looking for."7
Enter Professor Paul Bator of Harvard Law School. Ten
years after the decision came down, he pronounced that the
Court had taken a "radical" step without "any apparent understanding" of its significance: "With only Mr. Justice Jackson
disagreeing, eight of nine Justices assumed that on habeas corpus federal district courts must provide review of the merits of
constitutional claims fully litigated in the state-court system."'
Taking a view that has received some support from later Justices,' Bator claimed that in Brown the Court had suddenly and
Cases, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 417, 424-25 (James
Acker et al. eds., 1998) (stating that as numerous studies show, cases of capital
defendants "are more likely than those of defendants not facing execution to have
been infected by distortions arising from racism, the incompetence of defense counsel,
their own mental limitations, public passion, political pressures, or jury prejudice or
confusion," all of which results in "a dangerous increase in the risk that the system
will make a fatal error.").
7. Memorandum from Justice William 0. Douglas to the Conference 2 (Oct. 23,
1961) (Library of Congress, Hugo L. Black Papers, Box 60, Frankfurter File 195864). This memorandum was a reply to one dated September 25, 1961, from Felix
Frankfurter regarding possible changes in Court procedures, see infra note 127. See
generally Melvin I. Urofsky, The Failure of Felix Frankfurter, 26 U. RICH. L. REV.
175, 183-85 (1991) (discussing this interchange between Douglas and Frankfurter as
illustrative of the latters poor relationship with his colleagues).
8. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 500 (1963).
9. In Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992), Justice Thomas, in lengthy dicta in
an opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined, adopted the
Bator thesis, Wright, 505 U.S. at 285-288. Justice O'Connor, "writ[ing] separately
only to express disagreement with certain statements in [Justice Thomas'] extended
discussion . . . of this Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence," id. at 297 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), and joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, vigorously rejected it, id.
at 297-301 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy declined to enter the "difficult
historical inquiry," id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also infra notes 28, 203
(discussing O'Connor-Thomas debate and Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000)).
The earliest Justice to accept Professor Bator's views was Justice Harlan. See
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 456-63 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting);
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 261 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). He was
followed by several Nixon appointees, Justices Powell and Rehnquist and Chief Jus-
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silently decided "that it is the purpose of the federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction to redetermine the merits of federal constitutional questions decided in state criminal proceedings,""0 rather
than to assess the adequacy of the state's corrective process.
This theory suffers from three major weaknesses. Two have
long been apparent, and the third is the principal subject of this
Article.
First, the idea that a permanent revolution in the law of
habeas corpus took place because of an unexamined novel assumption silently shared by eight Justices who collectively wrote
six opinions in a controversial area of the law is implausible at
best. This would certainly be a unique way for major doctrinal
change to occur.
Second, the legal basis of the Bator thesis is simply wrong:
It was not the pre-existing law that the only question open on
federal habeas corpus was the adequacy of the state's corrective
process, as opposed to its outcome." Thus, the Court's reaffirmation of the role of the federal courts on habeas corpus-to
determine the correctness of the conclusions on the federal constitutional issues previously reached by the state courts-was in
no way revolutionary. 2
Third, the facts as revealed in the historical record refute
Bator's thesis.

tice Burger. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
10. Bator, supra note 8, at 500.
11. See Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 375, 433 (1998) ("For Bator Brown constituted a profound and dubious
change in the law. The Court is saying that the federal habeas court does have the
power to determine the factual predicates of alleged constitutional violations arising
out of the state criminal process. Contrary to Bator, however, this is not new. The
federal habeas courts had this power at least since Moore [v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923)].") (footnotes omitted); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme
Court and the Congress, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 367, 382 (1983) ("Was the decision a departure from prior holdings? The only fair answer is 'no.'"); see also infra Part IV.B.
12. See Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 662 (1982) ("By the time Brown v. Allen was decided, federal
habeas relitigation of state court determinations of federal law was simply not an
issue.").

2000]

Habeas Milestones-Brown v. Allen

1547

C. Outline
The primary purpose of this Article is to present new evidence rather than to advance new arguments. After laying out
the procedural background of Brown .in Part II.A, it centers, in
of the extant papers of the
Part lI.B, on a detailed examination
13
Justices of the Brown Court.
This review, embracing seven collections of documents' 4-- and including two sets of notes of the critical Court
conference' 5 -demonstrates that the Justices did not view
themselves as making new law concerning the scope of the writ.
Indeed, they went out of their way not to do so.'6 All of the Justices (except Jackson, who-egged on by his clerk William
Rehnquist-sought to alter existing law so as to narrow the
writ) 7 were working within a consensus that the substantive
nature of the inquiry that a federal habeas corpus court should
make into the constitutionality of prior state criminal proceedings was simply not on the table.
The Justices' focus internally was on exactly the concerns of
the published opinions, which are described in Part II.C.

13.

For brief sketches of the members of the Court at this period, see

JAN

PALMER, THE VINSON COURT ERA 6-14 (1990) and WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 32-35 (1987). For background on their inter-

actions, see Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United
States Supreme Court, 1988 DuKE L.J. 71 (1988).
14. These are: the collected papers of Hugo L. Black, Harold H. Burton, William
0. Douglas, and Robert H. Jackson in the Library of Congress; the papers of Felix
Frankfurter, which are physically divided between the Harvard Law Library and the
Library of Congress, but available on microfilm from University Publications of
America; the papers of Stanley Reed in the Margaret I. King Library of the University of Kentucky; and the papers of Tom C. Clark, Tarlton Law Library, University
of Texas at Austin. See also infra note 120.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 158-64.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 211-14.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 215-54. Thus, for example, Rehnquist,
approving Justice Jackson's idea "to completely forget about precedent and write a
new ticket," see infra text accompanying note 224, urged the Justice to write "an
incisive statement of new law," see infra text accompanying note 230. And Justice
Jackson wrote in his first draft: "It is my belief that our greatest need is not to try
to cite or apply the recent decisions on this subject but rather to try to clear the
site of many of them and to look forward rather than backward for our remedy."
See infra text accompanying note 241.
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Throughout the Court's deliberations, the central question was
the effect that a denial of certiorari from state court proceedings
should have in a subsequent federal habeas corpus action. The
ruling was that the requirement of filing a certiorari petition,
recently imposed by Darr v. Burford,"s would be retained, but
that the federal habeas corpus court should attribute no significance to its denial. 19
A secondary question was the degree to which the district
court hearing the federal habeas petition could rule on it summarily (meaning, as a practical matter, deny it),'0 simply on the
basis of the state court record. Here, the Justices, unable to join
a common opinion notwithstanding their lack of any substantive
disagreement,21 wrote cloudy language leaving the decision as
to whether to hold an evidentiary hearing to the district courts'
good judgment. The progress of drafts led to softening and compromise and, ultimately, the same amorphous standard of discretion that had been in place since Frank v. Magnum' or, at
the very least, since Moore v. Dempsey.'
The question of whether the federal courts should, in Bator's
words, "redetermine the merits of federal constitutional questions decided in state criminal proceedings"24 was not a point of
contention. No one doubted that, as had been clear since Frank
v. Magnum, or at the very least since Moore v. Dempsey, this

18.

339 U.S. 200 (1950) (discussed infra Part II.A.1).

19. See infra text accompanying note 256.
20. There is no reason to doubt that the Justices shared the premises that, although rarely articulated, still underlie the debate on the issue of hearings: (1) that
the fact-finding made by a district court is likely to shape, if not determine, the
ultimate appellate resolution of the legal issues presented by a federal habeas corpus
petition and (2) that a district judge is most unlikely to grant such a petition without a hearing. Thus, the more freedom the district courts have to grant or deny
hearings, the greater control they will have over the shape of the law and the more
grants of habeas relief are likely to occur.
21. See infra notes 204, 262.
22. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). See Eric M. Freedman, Leo Frank Lives: Untangling
the Historical Roots of Meaningful Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State
Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467, 1533-34 (2000) (arguing that Frank and Moore
were governed by same legal standard, in which hearings were discretionary); infra
Part IV.B.
23. 261 U.S. 86 (1923) See Freedman, supra note 22, at 1469 (reporting view
that the governing standard originated in Moore); see also supra note 11.
24. Bator, supra note 8, at 500.
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was precisely their role.' To the extent the matter arose, the
Justices' editorial changes were intended to ensure that the
opinions reaffirmed that the federal courts had an independent
duty to ensure that the state courts had reached correct legal
conclusions."5
Further, as Part III discusses, developments in the period
surrounding the decision do not support the thesis that it
worked a broadening of the writ. Contemporaries did not believe
that a major change had occurred, and the long-running battles
over federal habeas corpus continued, in the legislative and judicial arenas, just as they had before.2" Nor do statistics show
that the ruling triggered a landslide of successful petitions; indeed, there is reason to believe that, by reducing the number of
evidentiary hearings, its immediate impact was the opposite.
In short, as Part IV describes (and as most of today's Justices recognize),'m Brown fits smoothly into a line of precedent exm and Moore."
0 The only
tending back to Frank'
legal point that

25. See supra note 12.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 191-200 (discussing change made by Black
to remove any suggestion that the Court was retreating from Moore), 202 (discussing
Frankfurter's concern, later obviated by Reeds change, that the opinion appeared to
narrow the scope of review), 203 (discussing the change made by Reed to ensure
that the Court's opinion not be wrongly read as narrowing the scope of review), 21113 (discussing Burton's efforts with Clark to have a published opinion reflect the
consensus that existed between Frankfurter and Reed on this point); see also infra
note 203.
27. At the time of Brown, as the opinion itself shows, see Brown, 344 U.S. at
451 n.5 (opinion of the Court); id. at 539 & n.13 (Jackson, J., concurring), there
already existed a vocal constituency condemning federal habeas corpus review as
insufficiently deferential to the states-and attributing the cause to Moore, if not to
Frank. See infra text accompanying notes 288-90.
28. Justice Kennedy's historical summary of the growth of the writ in McCleskey
v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 478-80 (1991), contained in an opinion expressing the views of
six Justices (all presently sitting), is consistent with the view expressed in the text.
But it would appear that at least three current Justices reject that view. See supra
note 9 (discussing Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992)).
Earlier, six Justices had joined in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), which traced to Brown (and reaffirmed)
the rule that the federal habeas petitioner who claims he is detained pursuant
to a final judgment of a state court in violation of the United States Constitution is entitled to have the federal habeas court make its own independent
determination of his federal claim, without being bound by the determination
on the merits of that claim reached in the state proceedings.
Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87.
29. Indeed, as infra Part IV.B describes, each of the key Brown rulings can be
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Brown permanently decided-that the denial of certiorari on
direct appeal was not preclusive of federal habeas corpus review-was an incremental step, 3' at most,32 and related to procedure not substance. Brown did not change the scope of the review that a prisoner could obtain' but, rather, was designed to
make sure that, whatever its scope, the review would be meaningful; the Supreme Court did not have the institutional capacity to scrutinize the merits of prisoners' constitutional claims on
certiorari,3 4 so the task was to be performed by the District
Courts on habeas corpus.35
Thus, Part V concludes that, in addition to its other
flaws, 3 Bator's contrary, substantive theory-that independent
federal habeas corpus review of the constitutional validity of
state criminal convictions is a modern innovation attributable to
Brown-is simply contrary to the historical evidence.

clearly identified in the Frank opinion.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 323-24; see also infra text accompanying
notes 191-200; note 265.
31. See Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN L. REV. 247, 273-77
(1988).
32. Indeed, there is strong reason to believe that it was not even that much.
According to Professor Harper V. Fowler of Yale Law School, an authority on the
Court's certiorari practice, this holding was merely a restatement of prior law, and
the dissent's contrary view was "at variance . . . with the law as applied to habeas
corpus proceedings." Fowler V. Harper & Arnold Leibowitz, What the Supreme Court
Did and Did Not Do During the 1952 Term, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 427, 432 (1954); see
infra note 43 (quoting Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr. of Harvard Law School expressing same view).
33. As Professors Liebman and Hertz have documented, see LIEBMAN & HERTZ,
supra note 3, § 2.4d, at 67-68, this had been long settled by the time of Brown and
was simply re-iterated in that opinion.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 297-301; App. 1. See generally infra text
accompanying note 306.
35. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 3, §2.4d, at 68-69; Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 84, 106-08 (1959).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
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II. THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HISTORY OF
BROWN V. ALLEN

A The Legal Background
1. Darrv. Burford.-In April, 1950, Justice Reed, writing for
five members of the Court (with Justice Douglas not participating), held in Darr v. Burford 7 that, except in unusual circumstances, 3 a state prisoner was required to seek certiorari from
the denial of state collateral relief before filing a federal habeas
corpus petition. 9 At the same time, however, five of the Justices made clear in dictum their view that, this requirement having
been complied with, the denial of certiorari should be given no
weight by the District Court when passing upon the subsequent
habeas corpus application. 0 This opinion-inconsistent with
37. 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
38. The majority pointedly did not define these, but cited Moore v. Dempsey, 261

U.S. 86 (1923), with a "Compare." Darr, 339 U.S. at 210.
39. As the Judicial Conference of the United States later noted, "While [Darn]
involved a failure to seek a writ of certiorari from a decision of a state court denying postconviction relief, it [was] read by some prisoners as suggesting that they
must also file petitions in the Supreme Court of the United States from the affirmance of their convictions by a state supreme court." REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 50 (1962). To avoid the resulting
"useless and time consuming" filings, it recommended that the problem be fixed by
statute. Id. The Court then rendered this course unnecessary by overruling Darr in
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435-38 (1963). See also infra note 318.
40. Justices Burton and Clark, concurring, wrote that "the denial should be
disregarded in passing upon a subsequent application for relief." Darr, 339 U.S. at
219 (Burton, J., concurring). In dissenting, Justice Frankfurter, for himself and Justices Black and Jackson, wrote that "such a denial has no legal significance whatever bearing on the merits of the claim." Id. at 226 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Justice Reed's opinion, which on this point expressed the views only of himself, Chief Justice Vinson, and Justice Minton, did not explicitly discuss the issue.
Id at 216. It recognized the power of the district court to "disregard our denial of
certiorari," id., and justified the requirement that the prisoner seek certiorari on the
grounds that this procedure was more respectful of the states, not on any suggestion
that the Court had passed on the merits. Id. But it did write, "[i]t is this Court
which ordinarily should reverse state court judgments concerning local criminal administration." Darr, 339 U.S. at 216.
Technically, as Justice Reed was later to note, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 450 (1953), the issue of what weight the district court should give to a denial
of certiorari was not before the Darr Court because the petitioner in that case had
in fact never sought Supreme Court review from the state's denial of collateral re-
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one that had come down two years earlier4 1 and rendered in a
case that had not been argued orally4 2 -proved very confusing
to the lower federal courts,4" some of which concluded that the
district court should proceed to examine the federal habeas corpus petition de novo, and others of which felt that the denial of
certiorari was a factor of greater or lesser weight to be considered against the prisoner."
The Supreme Court-as it said twice in print45 and as is
clear throughout the records of its internal deliberations 4 5 -was
primarily seeking in Brown to resolve this problem.
2. The Decisions Below.-Brown originated in five certiorari
petitions granted in March, 1952:4"
a. Smith v. Baldi
Although ultimately decided in a separate published opinion,48 this case is of some significance in untangling the meaning of Brown. First, it represents the first post-Brown application of Brown.49 Second, we have the Court's own word ° that
certiorari was originally granted in this case, in tandem with the
others, primarily to determine what effect should be given in

lief.
41. That ruling was Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 679-82 (1948), a five-to-four
decision in which Justice Reed wrote a dissent that said in substance the same
thing as his majority opinion in Darr. Cf. Darr, 339 U.S. at 210 ("Whatever deviation Wade may imply from the established rule will be corrected by this decision.").
42. See PALMER, supra note 13, at 28.
43. See Hart, supra note 35, at 95 n.20 ("The prevailing opinion in Darr v.
Burford . . . unhappily confused the traditional doctrine in the field of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners until a divided Court straightened the matter out in
Brown v. Allen.").
44. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 451 n.4 (collecting cases).
45. See id. at 450-52; United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 565
(1953).
46. See infra Part II.B; see also infra text accompanying note 224 (quoting clerk
Rehnquist's observation that Justice Reed saw this as the point to be decided).
47. Data on the certiorari votes of the individual Justices respecting the four
cases that the Court eventually decided by plenary opinion is to be found in PALMER, supra note 13, at 355-56.
48. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 276-82.
50. Baldi, 344 U.S. at 565.

20001

Habeas Milestones-Brown v. Allen

1553

federal habeas corpus proceedings to the Court's prior action in
denying certiorari from state habeas proceedings."1
The Court acted sensibly in separating this case from the
others since it had an extensive prior history and raised a number of significant issues on the merits, but for our purposes it
may be summarized rather briefly.
In January, 1948, James Smith, who had a long history of
mental illness, shot and killed the driver of a taxi in which he
was riding as a passenger.52 He appeared at his arraignment
without counsel, and the judge asked a lawyer who happened to
be present in the courtroom to advise him.' "This lawyer, who
knew nothing about petitioner, advised him to enter a plea of
'not guilty."' The effect of this was that Smith lost the right to
have a preliminary jury determination of sanity.55 He eventually pleaded guilty as part of an arrangement to obtain evidence
from out of state concerning his psychiatric condition (because
under Pennsylvania law he was not entitled to the appointment
of a defense psychiatrist), and evidence on this issue was then
presented to a three-judge trial court as bearing upon sentence;
although it remained in dispute when or on what basis he had
been found guilty (and, implicitly, sane), this panel sentenced
him to death."
On direct appeal, the conviction and sentence were affirmed.5 7 Smith did not seek certiorari, but filed a federal habeas corpus petition; an en banc district court held an evidentiary
hearing, but eventually the writ "was denied on the ground that
petitioner was not within the jurisdiction of the court at the
time the proceeding was instituted,"' having been removed to
the execution site.59 After affirmance by the Third Circuit,"° no

51. Indeed, as shown infra Part II.B, the merits of the constitutional claims in
the individual cases were of only peripheral interest to the Court; during its internal
deliberations, the focus was on procedural matters concerning habeas corpus.
52. Brief and Affidavit of Counsel at 5, Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953) (No.
31).
53. Baldi, 344 U.S. at 561-62.
54. Id. at 562.
55. Id. at 567.
56. Id at 563, 566.
57. Commonwealth v. Smith, 66 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1949).
58. Baldi, 344 U.S. at 564.
59. See United States ex rel. Smith v. Warden, 87 F. Supp. 339, 340 (E.D. Pa.
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Supreme Court review was sought.6 1 "A petition for habeas corpus was then filed in the State Supreme Court. This was entertained on the merits and denied," 2 and certiorari was denied.63
Smith again sought federal habeas corpus, asserting the
same claims as in the state habeas petition."4 The district court
once more convened en banc, and denied the writ on a four-tothree vote.' The majority wrote:
[I]t is the law that where remedies are available under state law
and the highest state court has considered and adjudicated the
merits of the relator's contentions, including a full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions raised, and the United States
Supreme Court has either reviewed or declined to review the
state court's decision, then the district courts will not ordinarily,
upon writ of habeas corpus, re-examine the questions thus adjudicated.'
Smith had, to be sure, met the requirements of Darrby filing a
certiorari petition after the denial of state collateral relief, and
the court would give "no legal significance" to the denial of certiorari; but, "[i]n a valid exercise of sound judicial discretion, we
decline to re-examine, upon writ of habeas corpus, the questions.., adjudicated" in the state collateral proceedings. 7 The
dissenters considered this disposition "premature" and would
have held a hearing."
On appeal to the Third Circuit sitting en banc, a four-member majority agreed with the lower court's treatment of Darr,
but continued:
That [petitioner's] allegations have been decided on the merits by
the highest state court is a fact to be given great weight by a

1949).
60. United States ex rel. Smith v. Warden, 181 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1950).
61. See Baldi, 344 U.S. at 564.
62. Id. See Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Ashe, 71 A.2d 107 (Pa. 1950).
63. Pennsylvania ex rel. Smith v. Ashe, 340 U.S. 812 (1950).
64. See Baldi, 344 U.S. at 565.
65. United States ex rel Smith v. Baldi, 96 F. Supp. 100 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
66. Smith, 96 F. Supp. at 103 (citing Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944);
White v. Ragen, Warden, 324 U.S. 760, 764-65 (1945); John J. Parker, Limiting the
Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 174, 175-78 (1949)).
67. Smith, 96 F. Supp. at 104-05.
68. Id. at 106.
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district court in passing upon petitions for habeas corpus. But
that fact does not relieve the federal court of the duty to pass
upon the merits of the petition.
The District Court exercised its "discretion" to decline to pass
upon the merits. We do not think it had such discretion, and proceed to consider whether, if factually true, the petition sets forth
a violation of the federal Constitution.'

On the merits, the majority thought that there had been no
constitutional violation, while the dissenters-who documented
at length Smith's mental disabilities and the procedural miasma
in which
their consideration had been lost-believed the contrary.70
At this stage, in March, 1952, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.7 '
b. McGee v. Ekberg
Although this case, too, ultimately formed no part of the
published Brown decision, having been dismissed as moot in
June, 1952 on the release of the prisoner,72 it is also significant
to a proper understanding of Brown, because it framed the issues eventually decided by the Court. 7
James Nel Ekberg, who had a long criminal history, was

69. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 1951). For
the reasons stated infra note 82, the ruling of the court of appeals, rather than that
of the district court, was the correct application of Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. at 114.
70. See Smith, 192 F.2d at 549 (Biggs, C.J., dissenting).
71. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 343 U.S. 903 (1952). The case, which
had been on the Miscellaneous Docket as No. 300, was given Appellate Docket No.
669 upon the grant of certiorari in the 1951 Term. When it was carried over to the
1952 Term for re-argument, see infra text accompanying notes, 139-40, it was designated No. 31.
For reasons lucidly explained in Bennett Boskey, Note, The Supreme Court's
Miscellaneous" Docket, 59 HARV. L. REV. 604 (1946), the Court at this period placed
on a Miscellaneous Docket (a) requests for extraordinary writs and (b) petitions for
certiorari in forma pauperis. In the event that one of these latter were granted, the
case was transferred to the Appellate Docket. See PALMER, supra note 13, at 23-24.
72. See McGee v. Ekberg, 343 U.S. 970 (1952). The release of the prisoner was
reported in a pool memorandum to all the Justices, which is undated but was probably written in early June, 1952, see Supplemental Memorandum re McGee v. Ekberg
(No. 517). This survives in various copies, including one in the Harold H. Burton
Papers, Library of Congress, Box 231, Briefs for Argued Cases, Book 4.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 122-24.
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convicted in a California trial court of check fraud and weapons
possession after a jury trial in which he was represented by
counsel; 74 on his pro se direct appeal, the conviction was affirmed in a reasoned opinion that systematically rejected various
claims of error, including some framed in constitutional
terms. 75 According to the government, Ekberg did not seek certiorari, but rather filed a state habeas corpus petition, which
was denied without opinion. 76 He sought certiorari from this
decision, which was denied. 7
Ekberg, again acting pro se, thereupon filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
District of California. 78 The most cogent federal claims presented in this rambling document were that Ekberg had been denied
counsel of his choice, represented incompetently by trial counsel,
and denied the right to call certain witnesses in his defense.7"
The petition and an application to file it in forma pauperis came
before District Judge Dall M. Lemmon, who denied it in an order that recited the procedural history and continued:
Where a state court has considered and adjudicated the merits of a petitioner's contentions a federal court will not ordinarily
re-examine upon writ of habeas corpus the questions thus adjudicated. The state of California accords remedies which give due
process of law and there is nothing alleged which presents "exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency" which entitle him to
the issuance of the writ. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 [(1944)];
U.S. ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 [(1925)]. This being the
situation this court should deny the right to file the petition in
forma pauperis and it is so ordered. Huffman v. Smith, 172 F.2d
129 [(9th Cir. 1949)].'

74. See People v. Ekberg, 211 P.2d 316, 317 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
75. Ekberg, 211 P.2d at 319.
76. See Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, McGee v.
Ekberg, 343 U.S. 970 (1952) (No. 517).
77. Ekberg v. California, 339 U.S. 969 (1950). The case file of this proceeding
(including Ekberg's handwritten legal work) is currently in the Washington facility of
the National Archives, Record Group No. 267, Case File 1792, Box 6217.
78. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, reprinted in Transcript of Record at
1-19, McGee v. Ekberg, 343 U.S. 970 (1952) (No. 517).
79. Id. at 8-11.
80. Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, reprinted in Transcript of
Record at 21, 31, McGee (No. 517). Noting that "there is a justiciable problem involved in this case," the District Judge thereupon issued a certificate of probable
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed in an opinion by
Chief Judge William Denman."1 The court of appeals held that
"special circumstances" were only required in the case of an
applicant who had not exhausted his state remedies; a petitioner
who had done so and pleaded a violation of federal constitutional
rights, was entitled to have the district court review the state
court record; accordingly, the Ninth Circuit remanded the matter to the district court for consideration on the merits.82 In
March, 1952, the Supreme Court granted the government's petition seeking review of this ruling."
The remaining three cases all began as criminal prosecutions in the North Carolina courts that were challenged by federal habeas corpus petitions in the United States District Court
for the District of North Carolina and then in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. They were, "for the
most part handled as one, particularly in the District Court."' 4
This is because each case had as a central element on the merits
a challenge to the jury selection system that North Carolina had
implemented to replace the one that the Supreme Court had
brusquely struck down as racially discriminatory in early
1 9 4 8 .' The cases were:
cause to appeal, id. at 34.
81. Ekberg v. McGee, 194 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1951); see also infra note 298 (describing Denman).
82. Ekberg, 194 F.2d at 180. A dissenting judge would have affirmed on the
basis that because the "petition for the writ presented no question of substance,"
there had been no error in its dismissal. Id. (Healy, J., dissenting).
The ruling of the court of appeals, unlike that of the district court, was in
accord with Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944), which specifically stated that the
requirement of
presenting 'exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency,' often quoted
from . . . United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, [269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925),
originated] in a case in which the petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies and is inapplicable to one in which the petitioner has exhausted his
state remedies, and in which he makes a substantial showing of a denial of
federal right.
Hawk, 321 U.S. at 117-18.
83. McGee v. Ekberg, 342 U.S. 952 (1952). The Washington facility of the National Archives contains in Records Group 267, Box 6790, the printer's copy of the
record of the lower court proceedings that was created for the Court's use as a result of this order.
84. Brief of Petitioner at 7, Speller v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (No. 22).
85. Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U.S. 851 (1948). This opinion consists of the
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c. Brown v. Allen
Clyde Brown, an illiterate black youth, was arrested for the
beating and rape of a white high school student." He was held
without charges for five days, during which time he confessed;
he was not given a preliminary hearing until eighteen days after
his arrest; and he was not formally appointed counsel until
three days after that. 7
In connection with the trial court proceedings, which resulted in a conviction by an all-white jury and a mandatory death
M he raised unsuccessful
sentence,"
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the voluntariness of his confession as well as to the
allegedly racially discriminatory manner in which the grand and
petit juries were selected in his case. 9 He renewed these contentions, also without success, on direct appeal to the North
Carolina Supreme Court 9° and in a petition for certiorari.9
His assertion of them in a federal habeas corpus petition
met with a summary denial in the District Court, on the basis
that the record did not reveal "any unusual situation" that
would justify issuing the writ in the face of the reasoned rejection of the claims by the trial and appellate courts of the state
and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari on the same re-

single word "Reversed," followed by a string-cite to the Court's classic jury discrimination cases.
86. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, reprinted in Transcript of Record at
1, 2-3, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (No. 32). The case attracted considerable
local notoriety, and the Winston-Salem Journal provided updates daily for the first
ten days. See, e.g., Case Against Brown Tightens; Beaten Girl Still Unconscious,
WINSTON-SALEM J., June 27, 1950, at 3; Doctors Fight to Save the Life of Girl, 17,
Brutally Beaten at Her Father's Radio Shop, WINSTON-SALEM J., June 17, 1950, at 1;
Youth Admits Criminal Assault Try, WINSTON-SALEM J., June 18, 1950, at 8; Youth
Admits He Beat Girl With Rifle, Police Report, WINSTON-SALEM J., June 25, 1950, at
1.
87. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 476; Order Appointing Counsel for Defendant, reprinted in Transcript of Record at 21, Brown (No. 32).
88. See Bill Woestendick, Jury Finds Brown Guilty of Rape; Death Penalty is
Mandatory, WINSTON-SALEM J., Sept. 15, 1950, at 1.
89. The trial court heard testimony and rendered findings of fact and conclusions of law on both issues. See Order on Motion to Quash Bill of Indictment, Transcript of Record at 50-53, 87-122, Brown (No. 32).
90. State v. Brown, 63 S.E.2d 99 (N.C. 1951).
91. Brown v. North Carolina, 341 U.S. 943 (1951). Justices Black and Douglas
voted to grant review. The text of the petition is reproduced in Transcript of Record
at 239-52, Brown (No. 32).
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cord.9 2 The Fourth Circuit affirmed in a brief opinion embracing this rationale.9 3 In March, 1952, the Supreme Court granted Brown's petition for certiorari. 4
d. Speller v. Allen
Raleigh Speller, "an illiterate and feeble-minded Negro of
about forty-six years of age,"95 was three times convicted of the
92. Brown v. Crawford, 98 F. Supp. 866, 867 (E.D. N.C. 1951).
93. This affirmance came in a per curiam opinion that also affirmed the ruling
of the district court in Speller, described infra text accompanying notes 101-03.
Speller v. Allen, 192 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1951). The panel consisted of Chief Judge
John J. Parker and Judges Morris A. Soper and Armistead M. Dobie. See infra
notes 286-87 and accompanying text (describing Parker).
The court of appeals wrote: "We think that dismissal in both cases was clearly
right [in] view of the action of the state Supreme Court upon the identical questions
presented to the court below and the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of
the United States," Speller, 192 F.2d at 478 (citing Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200
(1950); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944) (per curiam)).
The court of appeals here was relying upon a different portion of Ex parte
Hawk than the one quoted supra note 82. After that discussion of a petitioner who
had not exhausted state remedies (which was the situation presented by the case),
the Court had continued in dictum:
Where the state courts have considered and adjudicated the merits of his contentions, and this Court has either reviewed or declined to review the state
court's decision, a federal court will not ordinarily re-examine upon writ of
habeas corpus the questions thus adjudicated. Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224,
230-32 [(1924)]. But where resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a
full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions raised, either because the
state affords no remedy, see Mooney v. Holohon, [294 U.S. 103,] 115 [(1935)],
or because in the particular case the remedy afforded by state law proves in
practice unavailable or seriously inadequate, cf Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
[(1923)]; Ex parte Davis, 318 U.S. 412 [(1943)], a federal court should entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be remediless.
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. at 118.
This passage, whose first sentence stated a rule based on inapplicable authority (since Salinger was a case where a federal prisoner had made successive identical
claims on federal habeas corpus, see infra note 209) and the remainder of which
created exceptions whose contours were unclear, see infra note 327, was erased by
the holding in Brown that the Court's denial of review of state proceedings was to
be given no effect by a subsequent federal habeas corpus court, see infra note 256
and accompanying text. This is made clear by the fact that the three-Justice Brown
minority on the point, see infra note 256, rested its view squarely upon "the teaching of Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118," Brown, 344 U.S. at 456.
94. Brown v. Allen, 343 U.S. 903 (1952). At that point, the case, which had
been No. 333 on the Miscellaneous Docket, was assigned Appellate Docket No. 670
in the 1951 Term; when carried over to the 1952 Term for re-argument, see infra
text accompanying notes 139-40, it was designated No. 32.
95. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 3, reprinted in Transcript of Record at
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rape of a fifty-two-year-old white housewife and sentenced to
death." The first conviction was reversed because of racially
discriminatory jury selection.9 7 The second conviction was reversed on the basis that the defense had been denied a sufficient
opportunity to investigate possible racial bias in the jury selection mechanism." The third conviction was affirmed, in an
opinion whose principal holding was that the trial court had
acted properly when, after a full evidentiary hearing, it rejected
Speller's challenge to the jury selection procedure.' Certiorari
was denied."°
Speller thereupon pursued his challenge in a federal habeas
corpus petition. Over the government's objections, the district
court held a hearing. 10 1 It then dismissed the petition on the
alternative bases, first, that a "habeas corpus proceeding is not
available to the petitioner for the purpose of raising the identical
question passed upon in [the state] Courts" °2 and, "secondly,
that in any event, even if petitioner is now entitled to raise the
same question passed on in the State Courts, he has failed to
substantiate the charge that he did not have a trial according to
due process."'0 3 The Fourth Circuit affirmed in the brief opinion already described,' °4 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in March, 1952.05

2, Speller v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (No. 22).
96. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 477 (1953); Brief of Robert A. Allen ...
Opposing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Speller v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)
(No. 22).
97. State v. Speller, 47 S.E.2d 537 (N.C. 1948).
98. State v. Speller, 53 S.E.2d 294 (N.C. 1949).
99. State v. Speller, 57 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. 1950).
100. Speller v. North Carolina, 340 U.S. 835 (1950).
101. This revealed, among other things, that the slips or "scrolls" containing the
names of jurors that were drawn at random had dots on them showing the race of
the jurors and that of the 63 jurors actually summoned to attend Speller's trial, four
were black (6.3%, in a county in which 38% of the taxpayers were black, Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 481 (1953)); one of the blacks summoned reached voir dire, but
was not selected. See Speller v. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. 92, 97-98 (E.D.N.C. 1951).
102. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. at 95.
103. Id. at 97.
104. Speller v. Allen, 192 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1951) (described supra note 93).
105. Speller v. Allen, 342 U.S. 953 (1952). The case, which had been No. 274 on
the Miscellaneous Docket, was thereupon assigned No. 643 in the 1951 Term. When
carried over to the 1952 Term for re-argument, see infra text accompanying notes
139-40, it was designated No. 22.
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e. Daniels v. Allen
The cousins Lloyd Ray Daniels and Bennie Daniels, two
illiterate black teenagers, were each arrested before dawn on a
February morning and imprisoned on suspicion of the brutal
murder of a white taxicab driver, a crime that had strongly
outraged the local community."° After having been found mentally competent to stand trial, they were convicted and sentenced to death in proceedings which, they charged, had been
flawed by the use of racially discriminatory procedures for the
selection of their grand and petit juries, the admission of involuntary confessions which they had allegedly given while in custody, and the submission of instructions that precluded the jury
from passing upon this latter issue.0 7
Their counsel was one day late in serving the record on the
government and thereby forfeited their appeal as of right. °0
The North Carolina Supreme Court:
(a) declined to issue a discretionary writ of certiorari to
allow an appeal nevertheless, but pointed out that defendants
could seek leave to file a writ of error coram nobis;'°
(b) denied such leave when defendants did seek it;"' and
(c) dismissed the attempted direct appeal as untimely."'
The prisoners sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court from all of these rulings,"' which the state op-

106. See Brief for Petitioners at 3, 29-30, Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)
(No. 20).
107. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, reprinted in Transcript of Record at
1, 3, Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (No. 20).
108. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 484-85 (1953).
109. State v. Daniels, 56 S.E.2d 2 (N.C. 1949).
110. State v. Daniels,. 56 S.E.2d 646 (N.C. 1949). This terse opinion ruled that
the petition did not "make a prima facie showing of substance" and was therefore
"insufficient." Daniels, 56 S.E.2d at 647.
111. State v. Daniels, 57 S.E.2d 653 (N.C. 1950). In this opinion, the court stated, "We have carefully examined the record filed in this case and find no error
therein.... [Tihe judgment of the lower court is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed." Daniels, 57 S.E.2d at 654.
112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of North Carolina
and/or to the Superior Court, Pitt County, North Carolina at 1-2, Daniels v. North
Carolina, 339 U.S. 954 (1950) (No. 412 Misc.). This document is to be found in the
Washington facility of the National Archives and Record Administration, Record
Group 267, Entry 21. In addition to re-asserting the prior grounds for relief, this
petition challenged the rulings designated (a) and (b) in the text as Equal Protection
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posed on the grounds that there had been no ruling below on the
constitutional merits and that petitioners still had an available
state 4remedy by way of coram nobis."' Certiorari was de11
nied.
After a further unsuccessful coram nobis petition,1 5 the
prisoners sought federal habeas corpus. The warden moved to
dismiss; the district court denied the motion and heard evidence,
but subsequently concluded "that the decision overruling the
respondent's motion to dismiss the writ as a matter of law upon
the procedural history was erroneous, and that the motion
should have been granted."" 6

violations. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of North Carolina
and/or to the Superior Court, Pitt County, North Carolina at 11-12, 13-15, Daniels
(No. 412 Misc.).
113. The government argued that because the ruling described supra note 110
"merely held that the petition was insufficient, there is no reason why the Petitioners cannot now avail themselves of this remedy [coram nobis] if they will file a
proper and sufficient petition . . . The Respondent, therefore, contends that the Petitioners have never exhausted their remedies [and the North Carolina Supreme
Court] has, therefore, not passed upon the constitutional issues." Brief of the State
of North Carolina, Respondent, Opposing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28,
Daniels v. North Carolina, 339 U.S. 954 (1950) (No. 412 Misc).
Petitioners' response was that, even assuming that the ruling of the North
Carolina Supreme Court was procedural rather than substantive, repetitive resort to
the state courts was not required:
The fact that the highest court of the State may reconsider or review its own
judgment does not alter the circumstance that a judgment which finally decides and determines the rights of the litigants is reviewable by this Court.
Such a judgment is final for the purposes of [28 U.S.C.] Section 1257(3) . . .
[notwithstanding] the existence of a latent power in the rendering Court to
reopen or revise its judgment.
Reply Brief of Petitioners in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Daniels
v. North Carolina, 339 U.S. 954 (1950) (No. 412 Misc.).
Both of these documents are to be found in the Washington facility of the
National Archives, Record Group 267, Entry 21.
114. Daniels v. North Carolina, 339 U.S. 954 (1950).
115. State v. Daniels, 59 S.E.2d 430 (N.C. 1950). The court ruled that issues
sought to be pursued were presented to and passed upon by the trial court, so that
the prisoners were improperly attempting to use coram nobis as a substitute for an
appeal, rather than for its intended purpose of correcting errors not appearing of
record. Daniels, 59 S.E.2d at 432-35.
116. Daniels v. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. 208, 212 (E.D. N.C. 1951). The court considered in the alternative the possibility that it was entitled to intervene notwithstanding the prior state rulings "where it appears clearly that there has been such a
gross violation of a defendant's constitutional rights as amounts to a denial of even
the substance of a fair trial" but, reviewing the contentions made and their handling
by the North Carolina courts, concluded that "[iut is difficult to believe that any
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The Fourth Circuit affirmed, on the grounds that habeas
corpus could not be used in lieu of an appeal to assert claims of
error, even constitutional error, but was available only where
there had been such a "gross violation of constitutional right as
to deny to the prisoner the substance of a fair trial" under circumstances where "he has been unable to protect himself' by the
ordinary mechanism of asserting his claims in state court.1 '
Dissenting, Judge Soper contended that "special and unusual
circumstances" existed, inasmuch as "the insistence by the state
upon a technical and trivial procedural step" was blocking review on the merits of petitions whose contentions respecting jury
selection were clearly meritorious."' In March, 1952, the Supreme Court granted certiorari."'
B. The DraftingProcess2 '
The cases were argued at the end of April; before taking the
bench, apparently, Justice Burton wrote across the bottom of his

impartial person would conclude" that this was such a case. Daniels, 99 F. Supp. at
213.
117. Daniels v. Allen, 192 F.2d 763, 767-68 (4th Cir. 1951). The Fourth Circuit
panel that heard Daniels consisted of the same three judges who also heard Brown
and Speller, see supra note 93.
118. Daniels, 192 F.2d at 772 (Soper, J., dissenting). Judge Soper relied for this
conclusion on "the two reversals in State v. Speller," see supra text accompanying
notes 97-98, and "a consideration of Brunson v. North Carolina, 333 U.S. 851 [19491"
(described supra note 85).
119. Daniels v. Allen, 342 U.S. 941 (1952). The case, which was No. 271 on the
Miscellaneous Docket, was then transferred to the Appellate Docket and assigned
No. 626. When carried over to the 1952 Term for re-argument, see infra text accompanying notes 139-40, it was designated No. 20.
120. This account is based on a review of the sources described supra note 14.
Its purpose is not to report every reference to Brown in the document sets indicated,
but rather to make a fair presentation of the points that are central to the present
inquiry.
When, as is frequently the case, the same document exists in several of these
collections, I have only cited to one of them, but I have reviewed all the copies for
annotations.
Because of the frequent use of these papers by sometimes-careless researchers
and the fact that Brown was in fact five cases, each bearing more than one number
and four of which were heard in two Terms, see supra Part II.A.2, the documents
referred to in this account may be found by future students in file locations slightly
different from those indicated here. As indicated supra note *, they are also
available from the reference desk of the Deane Law Library of Hofstra Law School.
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law clerk's bench memo:
It is not enough to say that fed question was presented to state
court on habeas corpus and denied and then cert denied by
USSC-for the factual conclusions in state ct may not have been
so considered as to present the case adequately in court-and
anyway cert. may have been denied for unrelated reasons (poor
record, out of time etc). There is a constitutional and statutory
right to have fed question passed on by fed ct.-and it is a fed ct
rule that before doing so it must be passed by state cts. (including
cert to USSC). Hence that routine is a qualifying routine rather
than one binding on the merits, to omit a part of this routine
would require explanation-but if it has been followed no exceptional circumstances are needed for the hearing or for the decision.121

The Court discussed the cases at a conference on May 3,
1952, where, according to Justice Douglas's notes, Chief Justice
Vinson stated as the
Question whether Denman's viewpoint or Parker's viewpoint
should prevail12 2-we should work out a procedure whereby in
some of the cases at least (not necessarily all) the bearings are
set down. [I]t is suggested that Reed & FF who have opposing
views prepare memorandum for the Conference on our precedents-."
More tersely, Justice Burton recorded:
Duel between Denman and Parker views.
Frankfurter v. Reed
RHJ suggests memos from both. 24

121. Annotations by Justice Harold H. Burton on Bench Memorandum, McGee v.
Ekberg 4 (No. 517) (Apr. 27, 1952) (Harold H. Burton Papers, Library of Congress,
Box 231, Briefs for Argued Cases, Book 4) (original emphasis).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82; note 93.
123. Conference Notes by Justice William 0. Douglas Regarding McGee v. Ekberg
(No. 517) (May 3, 1952) (William 0. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 210,
Argued Cases Memos). See generally Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Inside
the Supreme Court: The Reliability of the Justices' Conference Records, 58 J. POL.
528 (1996) (studying conference records of four Justices, including Douglas, for 196768 Terms and finding them "substantially accurate and reliable").
124. Conference Notes by Justice Harold H. Burton Regarding Nos. 517, 626, 643,
670, 669 (May 3, 1952) (Burton Papers, Library of Congress, Box 231, Briefs for
Argued Cases, Book 4). On his copy of the Conference List for May 3, 1952, Justice
Burton also noted of the habeas cases, "All go over for memos from SR & FF." This
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On June 3, 1952, Justice Frankfurter circulated a memorandum beginning, "I give up!"" He explained that he would be
unable to complete his assignment-"a canvass of issues involved in Darr v. Burford in the light of conflicting views that
have arisen among the various circuits (both in the District
Courts and the Courts of Appeals)"-before the conclusion of the
Term, in light of the extensive work involved and the intervening distraction of the Steel Seizure Case.128 He concluded by
suggesting that, rather than being re-argued (so as to preserve
the fiction that the Court cleared its docket at the end of each
Term), the cases simply be held over.2 7
Because he "thought they might be useful in determining
our course on Brother Frankfurter's suggestion," Justice Reed
circulated on June 4 draft opinions in the cases. These were "not
proofread and obviously are rough,"" being much more complete in their recitations of the procedural history than in their
legal analysis. The key points were:
1. A district court had the discretion on habeas corpus to
give "such consideration to our denial" of certiorari
on direct
29
appeal "as that court feels the record justifies."
2. In particular, it might rely on the denial to avoid a re-

document is to be found in the Harold H. Burton Papers, Library of Congress, Box
235, Conference Sheets, Mar.-June 1952.
125. Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to the Brethren 1 (June 3, 1952) (Hugo L. Black Papers, Library of Congress, Container 314, Habeas Corpus Folder).
126. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice
Frankfurter noted in his memorandum, supra note 125, at 2, "Certiorari in that case
was granted the same day, on May 3rd, that the Habeas Corpus cases were as-

signed for reports."
127. Which of these two practices to follow was a contested issue among members of the Court, and was variously resolved, from the early part of the twentieth
century, see id., to its end. See Hart, supra note 35, at 94 n.14; Tony Mauro, No
More Dawdling; Rehnquist Takes Control of Supreme Court Docket, LEGAL TIMES,
July 5, 1999, at 1; Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Conference at
11 (Sept. 25, 1961) (Hugo L. Black Papers, Library of Congress, Box 60, Felix
Frankfurter File); see also infra note 139.
128. Memorandum from Justice Stanley Reed to the Conference Regarding Nos.
517, 626, 643, 670 & 669 (June 4, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19). This document was a covering memorandum to the draft opinion cited infra note 129.
129. Memorandum from Justice Stanley Reed Regarding McGee v. Ekberg 22
(June 4, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at
Austin, Box A19).
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examination of the state's determination of the constitutional
issues. "It is not necessary though they have the power for a
federal court to try the merits, fact or law a second time, to
assure protection of federal constitutional rights, a state trial
with a right of review in this Court may furnish the necessary
protection."3 °
Neither point survived the Justices' consideration. 3 ' The
ultimate Brown opinion squarely rejected the first.'3 2 And the
second passage was modified before publication13 3 to make
clear that which, according to Justice Reed, it had meant all
along:3 that the federal court might defer to the state proceedings only on matters of fact, not law, and only if "the state
process has given fair consideration to the issues and the offered
evidence, and has resulted in a satisfactory conclusion. " "'
Justice Frankfurter, plainly believing that the first problem
was the one at issue, responded on June 7 by circulating "tables
[to] afford a bird's eye view of the procedural steps in three of
the cases involved in our Habeas Corpus problem." 3 ' He explained that, because "I had not conceived the assignment which
was given to Stanley and me implied that we should rehash,
more or less, what we had said in Darr v. Burford,"'37 he
planned to compile similar procedural data
from the hundreds of cases in which review was sought here
during the present Term of State convictions. The purpose is to
ascertain what kind of issues, State or Federal, how unambiguously, and in what accessible form, they came here, in order to
ascertain, with any degree of reason, what inferences may fairly
be drawn from our denial of certiorari in such cases.... [Olnly by
such a quantitative study can we fairly deduce desirable rules of

130. Id. at 28 (citing Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950) (footnote omitted).
131. See infra text accompanying notes 159-64.
132. See infra text accompanying note 256.
133. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463-65 (1953) (appearing under the new
heading "Right to Plenary Hearing"); infra text accompanying notes 201-04 (tracing
changes), 203 (quoting passage as modified).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 176-78.
135. Brown, 344 U.S. at 463.
136. Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to The Brethren (June 7, 1952) (Hugo
L. Black Papers, Library of Congress, Supreme Court Case File, October Term 1952,
Habeas Corpus Folder).
137. Id.
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judicial administration by the Federal courts-this Court, in requiring certiorari to be applied for and the District Courts in
order to ascertain the bearing of such denials by us upon habeas
corpus jurisdiction-regardless of what we have said or have not
said in the past."
At the conference of June 7, 1952, there was "considerable
argument" on whether to set the cases for reargument,"9 and
it was eventually decided to do so. 40
As the Justices reconvened in the fall, Justice Reed circulated a draft opinion dated September 26, 1952, a revision of his
June 4 effort that reflected the additional legal analysis done
over the summer.'
One notable, albeit uncontroversial,'
addition was a footnote14 3 that, in language substantially similar to that contained in the final opinion,'" rejected a statutory construction proposed by Judge Parker that would have held
federal habeas corpus to be unavailable "in all states in which

138. Id.
139. Diary Entry by Justice Harold Burton (June 7, 1952) (Burton Papers, Library of Congress, Reel 3) ("W]e voted after considerable argument to set down
habeas corpus & Kerdoff [sic] cases for reargument in fall"); see Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 343 U.S. 972 (1952); see also Letter from Robert H. Jackson to
Felix Frankfurter (July 12, 1952) (Felix Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress,
Container 70) (recalling that Chief Justice Vinson "was very much upset ... that
the habeas corpus cases went over the term").
The disputed issue was surely whether to set the cases for reargument or simply to hold them over as Justice Frankfurter had suggested, see supra text accompanying note 127; there was plainly no realistic prospect of writing a decision in the
two days before the Court rose for the year, 343 U.S. at app. V (1952) (showing
Court's adjournment on June 9, 1952).
140. See Daniels v. Allen, 343 U.S. 973 (1952).
141. Memorandum from Justice Reed Regarding Brown v. Allen (Sept. 26, 1952)
(Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box
A19).
In this document, Justice Reed elaborated upon his June discussion regarding
the effect to be given to a denial of certiorari, see id. at 8-16, but he trimmed this
before publication, presumably after discovering that he was outvoted on the issue,
see infra text accompanying notes 158-59 (recording Conference discussion of October
27). His draft of December 4, 1952, see infra text accompanying note 171, covered
the issue in substantially the same manner as his final opinion does.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 159-61 (recording consensus on this point
in conference). Cf infra note 235 (describing evolution of views on issue in Justice
Jackson's chambers).
143. Memorandum from Justice Reed Regarding Brown v. Allen, supra note 141,
at 6 n.4.
144. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 n.2, 448 n.3, 449-50 (1953).
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successive applications may be made for habeas corpus to the
state courts," on the theory that in such states the petitioner
could never exhaust state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (1948).145
On October 13, 1952, as the four remaining cases were reargued,146 Justice Frankfurter circulated his "report of a study
undertaken at the request of the Conference into the problem
left open by Darr v. Burford, namely, the consequence of a denial of certiorari upon the disposition by a district court of a subsequent application for habeas corpus by a prisoner under State
sentence."14 7 This consisted of a two-page covering memorandum and a lengthy appendix, presenting substantially the same
empirical data that later appeared in the U.S. Reports, "8
which reported on an exhaustive survey of habeas corpus cases
during a recent year.
In a twenty-three-page accompanying memorandum of the
same date, 1 9 Justice Frankfurter argued with vigor the conclusions to be drawn from this work:
(a) Giving any weight to denials of certiorari would be
senseless, since the papers before the Court were frequently
unintelligible and, in any event, not available to the district
court, 5 ' and
145. See John J. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 176
(1949); infra note 235 (describing practical effect of proposal).
Justice Reed considered asking counsel to address this proposition when the
cases were re-argued, but "reached the conclusion that the time was rather short to
expect them to produce anything of value and that it would not be worthwhile to
make such a request." Memorandum from Justice Reed to the Conference Regarding
Brown v. Allen (Sept. 30, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19).
146. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 & n.* (1953); Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S.
561 (1953) (noting reargument occurring on October 13-14); supra text accompanying
note 72 (noting dismissal of Ekberg in June, 1952).
147. Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Conference Regarding
Nos. 20, 22, 31 & 32 (Oct. 13, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library,
University of Texas at Austin, Box A19).
148. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 514-32 (Appendix to opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
149. Memorandum of Mr. Justice Frankfurter Regarding Daniels v. Allen (Oct.
13, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin,
Box A19).
150. The substance of this argument, somewhat shortened and toned down, eventually appeared in his opinion in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 489-97 (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.); see also Supplemental Memorandum of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
Regarding Daniels v. Allen 2 (October 22, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law
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(b) fears of abusive use of the writ were greatly exaggerated,
since the prisoner had actually secured his release in only one of
the 126 cases studied. 151
On the question of how much reliance the district court
should place on prior state proceedings, the memorandum, in
terms later echoed in Justice Frankfurter's published
opinion,152 urged that this should be a discretionary judgment
informed by the state of the available record and the nature of
the issue to be decided. 15
On October 16, Justice Frankfurter circulated "Observations" on Justice Reed's memorandum of September 26:
Library, University of Texas at Austin) ("put[ting] on a single page what seem to me
to be the controlling data" in support of this position).
151. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 526 (Appendix to Opinion of Frankfurter, J.); see
also id at 510 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (noting that figures "showing that during
the last four years five State prisoners, all told, were discharged by federal district
courts, prove beyond peradventure that it is a baseless fear, a bogeyman, to worry
lest State convictions be upset by allowing district courts to entertain applications
for habeas corpus on behalf of prisoners under State sentence."). Cf infra text accompanying note 226 (presenting clerk Rehnquist's response to this argument); note
226 (citing Justice Jackson's response to this argument).
152. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 498-510 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); infra note 257
(quoting key portions).
153. Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 150, at 17-23. Cf. Freedman, supra
note 22, at 1533-34 (arguing that the Court adopted this rule in Frank)].
As to the record, Justice Frankfurter wrote that if
the record of the State proceedings is not filed or is found to be inadequate,
the judge is required to decide, with due regard to efficiency in judicial administration, whether it is more desirable to call for the record or to hold a hearing.... When the record of the State court proceedings is before the Court,
it may appear.. . that the facts . . . have been tried and adjudicated against
the applicant. Unless a vital flaw be found in the process of ascertaining such
facts in the State court, the District Judge will accept their determination in
the State proceeding and deny the application.
Frankfurter Memorandum, supra note 150, at 22-23.
As to the nature of the issues, he articulated a tripartite scheme that was
already well-established:
Where the dispute concerns the historical facts, the external events that
occurred, a State adjudication upon them should be conclusive. On the other
hand, some questions call for the exercise by the federal judge of independent
judgment on what are clearly matters of law.... Where the ascertainment of
the historical facts does not dispose of the claim but calls for interpretation of
the legal significance of such facts ....
the District Judge must exercise his
own judgment on this blend of facts and their legal values. Thus, so-called
mixed questions or the application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found leave the duty of adjudication with the Federal Judge.
Id. at 20, 23.
154. Observations by Mr. Justice Frankfurter on September 26 Memorandum by

1570

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 51:4:1541

This is a summary of what I get out of the memorandum
after careful reading:
When a State convict applies for a writ of habeas corpus in a
United States district court, that court, having informed itself of
the content and meaning of the record made in the courts of the
State which convicted him and on certiorari in this Court, should
ordinarily deny the application without more. "Ordinarily," fairly
interpreted, means that such an application should be denied
without more, save in extraordinary or exceptional circumstances.
This, together with discussion of the extraordinary circumstances alluded to, is designed to govern the exercise of discretion
in the lower federal courts. It is meant to do so to the end that a
minimum of interference with State administration of criminal
justice may result. Putting to one side the question whether the
interests of liberty to be served by the Great Writ should be subordinated to this one end, the difficulty with the rule [is that] it
does not and cannot, with the clarity and definiteness appropriate
to the problem, guide the exercise of discretion below....
Let me put to one side those aspects of our central problem
as to which there is, I assume, common ground among us: (1) The
applicant for the writ in the federal district court must have exhausted his State remedies, whatever they are, though this does
not mean that an applicant must have had recourse to all alternate remedies or repeated recourse to a single procedure if a
State afford such repeated recourse. (2) Starting with the ruling
in Darr v. Burford, the applicant, before he can go to a federal
district court on habeas corpus, must have been refused opportunity to have the denial of his federal constitutional claim in the
State court brought here for review. (3) The District Judge should
derive what light he can from the adjudicationin the State court.
Beyond these three aspects, [Mr. Justice Reed] and I part
company, more particularly as to the legal significance which the
District Judge is to give to a denial of certiorari here....
*

*

*

Howsoever phrased, a rule presupposing that some fruitful
legal conclusion is to be drawn from our denial of certiorari, as
though an adjudication instead of a refusal to adjudicate were

Mr. Justice Reed Regarding Brown v. Allen (Oct. 16, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers,
Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19). The Reed Memorandum is described supra text accompanying notes 141-45.
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involved, will inevitably lead in the courts below to that very
uncertainty and conflict to eliminate which we granted certiorari
in these cases."s
The remainder of the memorandum elaborated on the point
by showing that the District Judges in the present cases could
"with equal reasonableness" have concluded that the petitioners
had or had not presented special circumstances justifying disregard of the Court's previous denial of certiorari. 5 6
On October 17, 1952, Justices Reed and Frankfurter circulated a joint one-page memorandum suggesting:
that the Conference vote successively on the following two issues
before voting on the results in these cases:
1. The bearing of the denial of certiorari here on what the
district court should do with an application for habeas corpus.
2. The bearing of the adjudication by the State court of federal claims upon the157 district court's disposition of the application
for habeas corpus.
There was a preliminary discussion at the conference of
October 18, 1952 (which revealed that a majority favored affirming the denial of habeas relief in each case) 5 8 and a full one on
October 27, 1952. Two Justices' notes record this latter conference. Justice Douglas wrote:
CJ-The bearing of the denial of cert. here on what the district
court should do with an application for habeas corpus-CJ states
that question as one governing this group of casesBlack, FF, WOD, RHJ, HB & TC would give no weight to
fact that we denied cert.; but there are a number of different reasons given for the conclusion. Reed & Minton think denial of cert.
(though not res judicata) should be given weight-So does CJ
where the federal question was made in the state record & presented here
-that case so far as the process- that brought it here has been

155. Observations, supra note 154, at 2-4.
156. Id. at 5-11.
157. Memorandum from Justices Stanley Reed and Felix Frankfurter to the Conference Regarding Habeas Corpus Cases (Oct. 17, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers,
Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19).
158. Annotations by Justice Harold Burton on Memorandum Setting Cases to be
Conferenced on October 18, 1952 (Oct., 17 1952) (Harold H. Burton Papers, Library

of Congress, Box 248, List No. 1, Sheet 4).
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terminated-to compel the judge to have a plenary hearing in
habeas corpus is unfair
-CJ would not give any weight in the case if unfairness where
the issue of federal rights was not raised2. The bearing of the adjudication by the State court of federal
claims upon the district court's disposition of the application for
habeas corpus. On this Reed and F.F. as shown by their memos
are in substantial agreement-Black agrees with FF's memo on
this point-WOD does substantially-all agree.159
Justice Clark wrote:1"
F.F.
1. Shall D.C. pay any attention to Denial? None.
Reed: Must wk out admin. syst on 3 qu=
1-No collateral relief sought in State Court-in Brown-§2254-as
long as you can go before state judge must go there. This does not
mean identical questions-Both agree 2"
2. Must there be a hearing in Federal Court on what was done in
State Court § 2244
Both say NO
3. Effect of former proceedings:
(1) State record has weight only on whatever is decided there on
constitutional questions-where can get full record, should get
full record not always necessary to call for record-that is discretionary
Both agree Differences:
Reed
1. Reed does not say res adjudicata for you can't have that in
habeas corpus. DC may give weight to record before it including
State & our record-(but his decision must not be on our denial) in

159. Conference Notes by Justice William 0. Douglas Regarding Daniels v. Allen
(Oct. 27, 1952) (Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 222, Argued Cases Office
and Conference Memos).
160. Conference Notes by Justice Tom C. Clark Regarding Daniels v. Allen (Oct.
27, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin,
Box A-19).
161. Put slightly more formally, this appears to be a consensus that, as the
Court eventually held, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447-50 (1953), the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 does require the
pursuit of any state post-conviction remedies that might be available for the presentation of constitutional issues not previously tendered to the state courts, but does
not require repetitive state filings on the same question. See Wilwording v. Swenson,
404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971).
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examining this record he should see that same record is involved
before him (& in that case deny)
2. What were our grounds for denial
FF on Differences:
Present Act (1867) DC authorized to question illegal detention

Ex parte Royal 5 2-DC can come in anytime-habeas corpus
more effective here than in England-old common law conception
was whether court had jurisdiction (could the court try the type of
case)
Johnson v. Zerbst-no counsel-then court had no jurisdiction-&
habeas corpus would test it"6
Give what
weight you please to a denial of cert. see p. 15 memo
10/13/52 'r

This discussion left Justice Frankfurter disturbed by what
he considered an unduly restrictive approach to the writ, and
concerned not with broadening it, but with preventing a threatened narrowing of it." He said so in a memorandum dated
October 28, 1952:'"

162. The reference is to Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
163. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465-68 (1938) (relying on Frank v.
Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), to hold that denial of counsel at trial could be attacked by federal habeas corpus since violation of the Sixth Amendment "stands as
a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence"). The Johnson decision was
well-grounded because Frank was based on the established meaning of "jurisdiction7
in the law of habeas corpus as a synonym for fundamental error, see id. at 331;
Freedman, supra note 22, at 1488 n.89. But cf. infra text accompanying note 219
(presenting clerk Rehnquist's view that Johnson was based on a "novel concept," although approving the result).
164. At the cited page of this memorandum, described supra text accompanying
note 149, Justice Frankfurter presented data showing that "[iun less than 10% of the
cases did the applicant file any papers which would serve to indicate to the District
Court what questions were before the Supreme Court." The same material appears
at Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 523 (1953) (Appendix to opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
165. In view of his subsequent comments, see infra text accompanying notes 17375, 202, there is every reason to believe that his objection was to a suggestion (recorded just before the second paragraph numbered 2 in Justice Clark's note) that he
considered cutting back on the existing independent authority of the federal habeas
court to investigate the state proceedings. As the account given below will indicate,
Justice Reed disclaimed any such purpose, and the Brown opinion was written to
incorporate this understanding. See infra text accompanying notes 176-78, 203-14.
166. Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to the Brethren Regarding Nos. 20, 22,
31 & 32 (Oct. 28, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of
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All things must come to an end and I should not like to be
unmindful of the fact that crying over spilt milk is for children,
not for grown men ....

But since a case in this Court is not over

until it is decided, I am venturing to put on paper what I did not
get around to saying in yesterday's discussion regarding habeas
corpus....
Callous and even cruel though it may seem, the fate of the
four petitioners is to me a matter of little importance. What this
Court may say regarding the writ of habeas corpus I deem of the
profoundest importance. Put in a few words, it makes all the
difference in the world whether we treat habeas corpus as just
another legal remedy in the procedural arsenal of our law, or
regard it as basic to the development of Anglo-American civilization and unlike other legal remedies, which are more or less
strictly defined ....

If such a conception is not merely to be

rhetoric and is to be an ever-living process to be enforced, certain
consequences follow which cannot be imprisoned within any such
rubrics as "jurisdiction," or "habeas corpus is not a substitute for
appeal," etc., etc....
*

*

*

I am not concerned with the concrete outcome of these cases-whether the judgments below are affirmed or not. I am profoundly concerned that in these days, when we boast at international conferences and otherwise through our political leaders, of
habeas corpus as one of the great agencies of the Anglo-American
world in safeguarding and promoting democracy," 7 this Court

Texas at Austin, Box A19).
167. Professors Derrick A. Bell, Jr. and Mary Duziak have both forcefully called
attention to the importance of Cold War propaganda considerations in the federal
government's enforcement of racial equality during this period. See Mary Duziak,
The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1614 (1997); Mary Duziak, Desegregation as a
Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518,
524 (1980); see also AZZA SALAMA LAYTON, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND CIVIL
RIGHTS POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1941-1960, at 1-11 (2000).
Similarly, the Court's consideration of Brown v. Allen took place against a
Cold War background, see infra note 181, and was intertwined chronologically-and,
surely, psychologically-with its consideration of "the cause cdl~bre of the 1952
term," BERRY, supra note 5, at 118, the espionage case against Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg.
At its conference of June 7, 1952, the same one at which it decided that the
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should not disregard the historic record, reflecting deep considerations of justice, and treat habeas corpus in a devitalizing manner as though it were construing merely one of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Marshall referred to the "obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should
receive life and activity." Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 95.1'
Congress has provided the means by the Act of February 5, 1867,

Brown cases should be re-argued the following fall, see supra text accompanying
notes 139-40, the Court determined not to review the Rosenbergs' convictions on
direct appeal, see Michael E. Parrish, Cold War Justice: The Supreme Court and the
Rosenbergs, 82 AM. HIST. REV. 805, 816-18 (1977) (describing conference), although
the order was not published until October 13, 1952. See Rosenberg v. United States,
344 U.S. 838 (1952); Letter from Ethel Rosenberg to Emanuel H. Block (Oct., 1952),
reprinted in THE ROSENBERG LETTERS: A COMPLETE EDITION OF THE PRISON LETIERS
OF JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG 441 (Michael Meerpool ed. 1994). The petitioners
sought re-hearing of this order, which, after a discussion in conference on November
8, 1952, see Parrish, supra, at 817 (describing conference), was denied in an order
published on November 17, Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U.S. 889 (1952).
The Rosenbergs then sought collateral relief, which was denied by the district
court, a result that the Second Circuit affirmed on December 31, 1952, United
States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1952). Their petition for certiorari seeking review of this decision was docketed on March 30, 1953, discussed in conference
on April 11, 1953, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 391
(1988), and-after significant internal tensions and a further discussion in conference
on May 23, 1953, see William Cohen, Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case: Setting the Record Straight, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 211, 229-36 (1985); Michael E.
Parrish, Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case: a Rejoinder, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
1048, 1050-54 (1985)-denied in an order of May 25, 1953, Rosenberg v. United
States, 345 U.S. 965 (1953). Justice Douglas's speech described infra note 181 was
delivered on May 20, 1953.
Throughout the lengthy litigation history of the case, see Rosenberg v. United
States, 346 U.S. 273, 277-85 (1953) (recounting procedural history through
defendants' execution on June 19, 1953), Justice Frankfurter (like Justice Black)
"voted to review the Rosenberg cases at every opportunity," Cohen, supra, at 214.
See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER 119-24 (1991). See generally Laura
Krugman Ray, Autobiography and Opinion: The Romantic Jurisprudence of Justice
William 0. Douglas, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 707, 726-27 (1999).
For a discussion of the impact of Cold War politics on the Court in the immediately succeeding period, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 258-65 (2000). See also Azza Salama Layton, InternationalPolitics and Civil Rights Policies in the United States, 1941-1960, at 1-11 (2000).
168. The reference is to Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (1807), which I have analyzed at length in Eric M. Freedman, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't
Make It So: Ex parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531
(2000). For discussion of the passage quoted in the text, see id. at 565, 569-70, 58687. However, Justice Frankfurter seems to have been using it merely for its rhetorical effect, rather than for any particular legal holding.
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14 Stat. 385.169 I pray that this Court do not shrivel them because of fear of potential abuse, or even an occasional abuse
170
which can easily be curbed without damage to the Great Writ.
Justice Reed circulated draft opinions on December 4,171 to
which Justice Frankfurter responded in a memorandum dated
December 19:
The chief concern in the course we have pursued in connection with the habeas corpus cases has not been the disposition of
these particular cases....
One vital point we have now definitively settled, namely that
our denial of certiorari has no significance in the exercise of the
District Court's jurisdiction....
I think I am accurate in saying that Stanley said he agreed
with the views I expressed regarding the relation of the State
proceedings to proceedings in the District Court. I am sorry to
say, however, that I do not find this agreement reflected in his
opinion....
I have not dealt with the merits of these cases, that is,
whether the judgments in these cases should be affirmed. I have
not yet dealt with them even in my own mind. I repeat, what we
do with
these specific cases is not the major problem before
72
1

US.

Justice Frankfurter annexed a version of his memorandum of
October 13, with the section dealing with the district courts'
treatment of prior state proceedings1 73 revised to respond specifically to Justice Reed's draft. The essence of these comments
was that Justice Reed's formulations left the District Judge with
too much scope to deny a habeas corpus application summarily,
partially because they did not clearly reiterate the judge's duty
to decide issues of law de novo, and partially because they
seemed to allow the judge too much room to make legal rulings

169. See Freedman, supra note 168, at 538-39 & n.19.
170. Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter, supra note 166, at 1, 5-6.
171. One of these covered Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953), and the other one
covered the remaining cases. Copies of these drafts are to be found in, among other
places, the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19.
172. Memorandum from Justice Felix Frankfurter to the Brethren Nos. 20, 22, 31
& 32, at 1-2 (Dec. 19, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University
of Texas at Austin, Box A19).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
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in the absence of any factual record at all (whether compiled in
state court or at a federal habeas corpus hearing):174
[Mr. Justice Reed's] opinion seems to me to disregard the
command of Congress that the federal courts decide the legal
questions raised in a petition for habeas corpus.... [I]t would

rub out the statute to say that the State determination of the
legal question can be conclusive. Yet [Mr. Justice Reed] would
permit summary denial of the application if the District Judge is
satisfied, "by the record," that the State has given "fair consideration" to the issues, if the record of the State proceedings is sufficient to make, and the District Judge does make, the determination that "no unusual circumstances calling for a hearing are
presented," if he is satisfied that federal constitutional rights
have been protected, or, again, if he concludes a hearing is not
"proper." At best, these expressions hardly make clear what the
determination is that is to be made.17
Justice Reed responded by insisting that no change in the
current availability of the writ was intended, writing on December 24:176

My draft opinion of December 4th was.., not written with
any purpose of limiting access of state prisoners to the federal
courts but rather to simplify that access in situations covered by
the statute.
When my memorandum in Brown v. Allen of September 26th
was discussed at Conference with the memorandum of [Justice
Frankfurter], I felt that our views were not far apart on matters
other than the weight to be given our denial of certiorari. I still
think this is true....
There is suggestion [in Justice Frankfurter's] Comment that

174. E.g., Memorandum of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, supra note 172, at 9 ("Congress has placed no obstacles in the way of a hearing such as [Mr. Justice Reed]
seems to suggest."), 10 ("Nor does [Mr. Justice Reed] give appropriate guidance to
the District Judge as to the circumstances in which it is 'proper' to hold a hearing.
His opinion seems to me to authorize whatever the District Judge happens to be
disposed to do."), 12 ("The District Judge is not told what to do if the record is silent on the relevant questions, and certainly a reasonable District Judge could read
the language . . . to mean that he did not need to go beyond whatever record is
available.").
175. Id. at 14 (footnotes omitted).
176. Memorandum from Justice Stanley Reed to the Conference Regarding Nos.
32, 22 & 20 (Dec. 24, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University
of Texas at Austin, Box A19).
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my draft allows the "district judge summarily" to deny an application by accepting the rule of the state court. This was not intended by me nor do I think it can properly be said that my draft
opinion does so. 177 . . .
My draft is intended to and I think does leave entirely open
to the District Court to take up those unusual situations ...
when in his views justice has not been done in the state courts.
He must determine whether the record shows denial of constitutional rights; he must hold hearings if he is in17doubt; and he may
dismiss without a hearing if he has no doubt. 1

When Justice Reed circulated a revised draft opinion on
December 29, 1952,79 it did not, Justice Frankfurter reported
on December 31, "meet the points in my Memorandum of December 19":"'i
The uniqueness of habeas corpus in the procedural armory of
our law cannot be too often emphasized.... Its history and function in our legal system and the unavailability of the writ in
totalitarian societies are naturally enough regarded as one of the
decisively differentiating factors between our democracy and
totalitarian governments. 8'

177. At this point, Justice Reed quotes the passage reproduced infra text accompanying note 203-minus, of course, the phrases later added, see id.-which "summarizes the teaching of the opinion," Memorandum, supra note 176, at 2.
178. Id. at 1-2, 4.
179. A copy may be found, among other places, in the Tom C. Clark Papers,
Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19.
180. Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to the Brethren Regarding Nos. 20, 22,
31 & 32, at 1 (Dec. 31, 1952) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19).
181. Cf. William O. Douglas, A Crusade for the Bar: Due Process in a Time of
World Conflict, 39 A.B.A. J. 871, 874-75 (1953) (address delivered to the American
Law Institute, May 20, 1953):
America, seen from abroad, seems alarmed, confused,, and intolerant.
The reasons are manifold. One important cause is a growing tendency in the
interests of security to take short cuts, to disregard the rights of the individual, to sponsor the cause of intolerance and to adopt more and more the tactics
of the world forces we oppose. These practices and attitudes may go unnoticed
here, but they make headlines in Asia. They are a powerful Voice of America,
more powerful indeed than any program we can produce for radio broadcast.
They have helped lose for America the commanding position of moral leadership which we had at the end of World War II.
Last year I visited Burma, torn by civil war for the last five
years[,] ...
and talked with lawyers and judges. . . . The writ of habeas
corpus was flourishing and respected. . . . A much higher standard governs
the admission of confessions in criminal trials in Burma than in any court in
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It is inadmissible to deny the use of the writ merely because
a State court has passed on a Federal constitutional issue."8 2 It
is equally inadmissible to leave each district judge effectively at
large.., by cloudy and confusing language as to what we expect
from the district judges."s
Is it asking too much to ask that if Brother Reed could sign,
as he said he could, my formulations for guiding the district judges on pages 6-19 of my memorandum of December 19, that he
sign them? 4 . . .
Let me now state specifically why I cannot approve the revised opinion of Mr. Justice Reed on these matters....

I thor-

oughly agree that the habeas corpus procedure must be saved
from abuse by excessive and repetitious applications, and I insist
only that the statute does require us to insure that the State
prisoner will have one opportunity to test his federal claim in the
federal courts .. .' I approach the problem with the same anx-

the United States ...
Those experiences brought, of course, a swelling pride in my heart at
the glories of due process . . . But what I saw has greater significance. Burma
is winning her battle for Burmese hearts and minds . . . by the use of more
than military tactics. Due process, as well as bullets, helps win those wars
against Communism.
This talk was widely reprinted. William 0. Douglas, A Challenge to the Bar, 28
NOTRE DAME L. 497 (1953); William 0. Douglas, Address Before the American Law
Institute, 12 LAW. GUILD REV. 145 (1953); William 0. Douglas, Some Antecedents of
Due Process, 2 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1953). See generally supra note 167.
182. At this point, Justice Reed wrote across his copy, which is to be found in
the Stanley Reed Papers, Margaret I. King Library, University of Kentucky, Box
147, "Why? No reason not to." See infra note 185 (discussing the meaning of this
note).
183. The elided material is quoted more fully infra note 209.
184. The material referred to is that which later appeared in more elaborate
form in Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 501-508
(1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). For some possible responses to Justice
Frankfurter's question, see infra note 204.
185. Justice Reed underlined the word "test" in his copy, which is to be found in
the Stanley Reed Papers, Margaret I. King Library, University of Kentucky Library,
Box 147, and wrote in the margin: "What is meant-not a hearing fn P 13 of Comment [] says no." The reference is to a passage in Justice Frankfurter's December 19
memorandum, see supra note 172, which, in substantially the same language as that
appearing in his opinion in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 504 (1953) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.), authorizes district judges to dispose of habeas corpus proceedings
summarily when the record is sufficiently clear for them to do so.
In other words, as the two Justices recognized in emphasizing the common
ground between them, see supra text accompanying notes 172, 177-78; infra text
accompanying note 189; see also infra text accompanying note 231 (presenting clerk
Rehnquist's summary of Justice Reed's position), there was no disagreement that the
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iety about abuse of the writ as does MR. JUSTICE REED, and I
have clearly delimited my standards to the one opportunity which
the State prisoner is given by Congress. What I do insist is that
we do not, by ambiguous or meaningless phrase, leave it open to
the District Judge, if he is so disposed, to shut off that one opportunity. If we do, we would, as MR. JUSTICE REED correctly

infers, wipe out the practical efficacy of federal habeas corpus for
State prisoners.
II. It helps my understanding, if not that of a District Judge
reading the opinion without libretto, to know that "the teaching"
of Mr. Justice Reed's opinion is summarized in the excerpt he
quotes on page 2 of his letter.186 I should be sorry if this were
all we had been able to achieve by two arguments and numerous
circulations and conferences in these cases. But ...

should we

leave resort to a hearing to the "discretion" of the District Judge
without indicating some standards for the exercise of
discretion?'8 7 On the other hand, is the statute satisfied by dismissal of an application when the State has given "fair consideration" to the issues? The congressional requirement is greater.
The State court cannot have the last say when it, though on fair
consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness,
may have misconceived a federal constitutional right....
V. My Memorandum certainly does not say that it is enough
that the record shows that the merits received "fair consideration"
in the State courts. See point II above, and pp. 14-16 of my
Memorandum."s At the same time, I think often a "hearing" is
unnecessary even when legal questions are involved that require
a decision by the federal judge....
It is at best awkward to have the Court's position on one
aspect of the case-the nonsignificance of denial of certiorari
here-expressed in a so-called dissenting opinion. Inasmuch as

prisoner was entitled to an independent ruling on the constitutional merits from the
federal court, see supra text accompanying notes 24-26; the sparring was over the
criteria that would entitle the applicant to a plenary hearing on the facts, see infra
notes 257-58 and accompanying text (describing ultimate resolution).
186. See supra note 177; infra note 203 and accompanying text (showing change

made to this passage before publication).
187. In his copy, supra note 185, Justice Reed underlined "discretion" and wrote
in the margin "must be left to discretion as defined on p 2 of my memo," a reference to the same passage cited supra note 186. Justice Frankfurter retained portions
of this memorandum in his published opinion, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 446-47
(1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
188. This latter material has been partially quoted supra text accompanying note

175.
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Brother REED has said he can agree with what I have written as
to the bearing of the proceedings in the State courts on the disposition of the applications for the writ before the District Judge, I
suggest an opinion per curiam to consist of the substance of what
I have drafted on the general procedural issues and, since a majority of the Court is with Brother REED on the merits, what he
has written on the merits[, thus]... presenting in a single opinion the matters on which a majority of the Court, and therefore
the Court, agree.189
On January 23, 1953, Justice Frankfurter circulated another draft of his opinion on the habeas issues.'"
Also on January 23, Justice Black circulated a draft dissent
on the merits. 9 ' Objecting to the Court's failure to review
Daniels because of the one-day delay in serving the appeals
papers, Justice Black wrote that
the object of habeas corpus is to search records to prevent illegal
imprisonments. Habeas corpus can have no higher function. To

189. Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to the Brethren Regarding Habeas
Corpus Cases Nos. 20, 22, 31 & 32, supra note 180, at 1-6, 8.
190. A copy of this draft with a covering memorandum may be found, among
other places, in the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas
at Austin, Box A19.
The key change was the addition of the paragraph that now appears as the
first paragraph of Justice Frankfurters opinion in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 503
(1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), dealing with procedural defaults on the state
level. In his covering memorandum, Justice Frankfurter said, "I have heretofore
written nothing about this aspect of the general problem because I stupidly had not
realized it bothered some of the Brethren,' Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to
the Brethren (Jan. 23, 1953) (Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University
of Texas at Austin, Box A19), a statement that can only be explained by the assumption that he had not yet turned his mind to the merits of the cases, especially
Daniels. See supra text accompanying notes 108-18 (describing procedural default
issue in case); see also Brown, 344 U.S. at 557-60 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (objecting to the Court's failure to reach the merits notwithstanding procedural default);
infra text accompanying notes 267-71.
In fact, the assumption appears quite sound. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter
to Harold Burton (Jan. 27, 1953), (Felix Frankfurter Papers, supra note 14, Part HI,
Reel 1, Frame 260 ("111 deal with the Daniels case when I come to deal with the
merits of the four cases."); see also Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to the
Brethren (Jan. 23, 1953), supra ("[Tihis opinion is not concerned with the disposition
of the immediate cases before us.").
191. Draft Dissent from Hugo Black re Nos. 32, 22 & 20, to the Brethren (Jan.
23, 1953). A copy of this draft, applying to Brown, Speller, and Daniels, may be
found, among other places, in the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19.
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hold it unavailable under the circumstances here is to degrade it.
I had thought that Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, would forbid
this. Perhaps the Court's opinion overrules it. That case has stood
for the principle that this Court will look straight through procedural screens to see if a man's life or liberty is being forfeited in
defiance of the Constitution. I would follow that principle
here. 192

This passage provoked an immediate reaction from Justice
Frankfurter. In a handwritten note also dated January 23, 1953,
after praising Justice Black's "spirited piece of pithy writing," he
continued, "I do beg of you, however, to cut the sentence...
'Perhaps the Court's opinion overrules it.'"193 To "give needless
ammunition to those who want to weaken the force of that opinion at least as a standard to which we can appeal" would, he
suggested, not be "good intellectual strategy."194
Justice Black took the point. In a handwritten response, he
thanked Justice Frankfurter and continued: "I have never had
an idea that it would be necessary to keep the line about Moore
v. Dempsey-I hope it will provoke a denial-At any rate, I shall
change the expression before the cases go down."'95 His next
draft, circulated on January 28, 1953, removed the suggestion
that Moore was anything other than good law:
To hold [habeas corpus] unavailable under the circumstances here
is to degrade it. I think Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, forbids
this. That case stands for the principle that this Court will look
straight through procedural screens to see if a man's life or liberty is being forfeited in defiance of the Constitution. I would follow
that principle here.'

192. Id. at 5-6.
193. Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Hugo L. Black (Jan. 23,
1953) (Hugo L. Black Papers, Library of Congress, Container 315, Brown v. Allen
Folder).
194. Id. This concern illustrates how far off the mark Professor Bator's thesis is.
See infra note 310.
195. Letter from Justice Hugo L. Black to Justice Felix Frankfurter (on file in
the Felix Frankfurter Papers, supra note 14, Part I, Reel 66, Frame 00038). The
document is undated, but on the basis of the chronology set forth in this paragraph
of text, was surely written sometime between January 23 and January 28, 1953.
196. Draft from Justice Hugo Black to the Brethren Regarding Nos. 32, 22 & 20,
at 6 (Jan. 28, 1953) (on file in the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19).

2000]

Habeas Milestones-Brown v. Allen

1583

And in his final version, circulated on January 31, 1953,'
which is the one that appears in print,' he elaborated on the
point:
To hold [habeas corpus] unavailable under the circumstances here
is to degrade it. I think Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, forbids
this. In that case Negroes had been convicted and sentenced to
death by an all-white jury selected under a practice of systematic
exclusion of Negroes from juries. The State Supreme Court had
refused to consider this discrimination on the ground that the
objection to it had come too late. This Court had denied certiorari.
Later a federal district court summarily dismissed a petition for
habeas corpus alleging the foregoing and other very serious acts
of trial unfairness, all of which had been urged upon this Court in
the prior certiorari petition. This Court nevertheless held that the
District Court had committed error in refusing to examine the
facts alleged. 1 I read Moore v. Dempsey, supra, as standing for
the principle that it is never too late for courts in habeas corpus
proceedings to look straight through procedural screens in order
to prevent forfeiture of life or liberty in flagrant defiance of the
Constitution.... Perhaps there is no more exalted judicial
function. I am willing to agree that it should not be exercised in
cases like these except under special circumstances or in extraordinary situations. But I cannot join in any opinion that attempts
to confine the Great Writ within rigid formalistic boundaries.2"
Meanwhile, the Court had been solidifying a consensus on
the procedural issues that had been in the Justices' understandings but not in their drafts.2 ' On January 27, Justice Frankfurter wrote to Justice Burton that his key objection to Justice
Reed's draft was: "I don't want District judges to assume that
merely because a federal claim has been examined in the State
courts, it need not be examined even once in a federal court."" 2

197.

Draft from Justice Hugo Black to the Brethren Regarding Nos. 32, 22 & 20,

at 6-7 (Jan. 31, 1953) (on file in the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library,
University of Texas at Austin, Box A19).
198. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 553-54 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting).
199. This is an accurate summary of the procedural history of Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 (1923). Extensive documentation of it can be found at Freedman, supra
note 22, at 1506-30.
200. Draft, supra note 197, at 6-7.

201. See supra note 185.
202. Letter from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Harold H. Burton (Jan. 27,
1953), supra note 190.
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On January 30, Justice Reed circulated the following:
At the suggestion of some of the Brethren, I am rephrasing
p. 18 to read as indicated below. The added words are underscored.
"It was under this general rule that this Court approved in
Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 231, the procedure that a federal
judge might refuse a writ where application for one had been
made to and refused by another federal judge and the second
judge is of the opinion that in the light of the record a satisfactory
conclusion has been reached. That procedure is also applicable to
state prisoners. Darr v. Burford, supra, 214-215.
"Applications to district courts on grounds determined adversely to the applicant by state courts should follow the same
procedure-a refusal of the writ without more, if the court is
satisfied, by the record, that the state process has given fair consideration to the issues and the offered evidence, and has resulted
in a satisfactory conclusion.... ,'

203. Memorandum from Justice Stanley Reed to the Conference Regarding Nos.
32, 22 & 20 (Jan. 30, 1953) (on file in the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19).
As Justice O'Connor summarizes in a portion of her opinion in Williams v.
Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000) that expresses the views of the Court, the meaning of
the italicized phrase has been the subject of some disagreement among subsequent
Justices. See Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1522-23. In his three-Justice opinion in Wright
v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 287 (1992), Justice Thomas suggested that "a satisfactory
conclusion" might mean a reasonable one as opposed to a correct one. Justice
O'Connor, in an opinion also expressing the views of three Justices, convincingly
rebutted this view, correctly pointing out that the passage relates to determinations
of fact, not questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact. See Wright, 505
U.S. at 299-302; supra notes 9, 153; infra note 257. The history presented
here-clearly showing that the phrase was added precisely to obviate concerns that
the opinions might be read to narrow the federal courts' duty to review the latter
categories of question de novo-strongly supports Justice O'Connor's position. See
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Following Justice Reed's change, see also supra note 133, the published passage in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463-64 (1953) read:
Applications to district courts on grounds determined adversely to the
applicant by state courts should follow the same principle-a refusal of the
writ without more, if the court is satisfied, by the record, that the state process has given fair consideration to the issues and the offered evidence, and
has resulted in a satisfactory conclusion. Where the record of the application
affords an adequate opportunity to weigh the sufficiency of the allegations and
the evidence, and no unusual circumstances calling for a hearing are presented, a repetition of the trial is not required ....
However, a trial may be had
in the discretion of the federal court or judge hearing the new application. A
way is left open to redress violations of the Constitution ....

Moore v. Demp-
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The precise origins of this change, which obviated
Frankfurter's objection, 2°' are unclear, but it plainly had substantial support. Justices Burton and Clark, in particular, had
clearly been thinking about ensuring that the Court's ultimate
product reflected its underlying consensus on the procedural
issues.
On January 16, Justice Burton sent Justice Clark a typed
draft of what was to become their brief joint statement, 25 with
a handwritten covering note saying, "I am not circulating this
but am holding it for our consideration after we see what Justice
Frankfurter finally writes." 206 When Justice Frankfurter's January 23 draft arrived in Justice Clark's chambers, the latter's
law clerk, Bernard Weisberg, °7 wrote a memo pointing out
that, although the differences between Justices Frankfurter and
Reed had narrowed, there was still considerable room for misunderstanding. 208 Substantively, there were still differences as to

sey, 261 U.S. 86. Although they have the power, it is not necessary for federal
courts to hold hearings on the merits, facts or law a second time when satisfied that federal constitutional rights have been protected. It is necessary to
exercise jurisdiction to the extent of determining by examination of the record
whether or not a hearing would serve the ends of justice. (footnotes omitted)
204. An outsider can only speculate as to why at this point the Justices could
not agree on a draft. But the fact is probably best explained by some combination of
tense inter-personal relations on the Court, see Urofsky, supra note 13, the normal
investment of people in prose compositions to which they have devoted much work,
see Douglas, supra note 7, at 2 (implicitly attributing form of Brown opinions to this
factor), and an unwillingness to labor further on this long-running project. With
respect to this last point, it may be relevant that, in light of the Second Circuit's
denial of relief on December 31, 1952, see supra note 167, the Justices knew that
they would soon be confronting a climactic appeal from the Rosenbergs.
205. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 487-88 (1953) (opinion of Burton & Clark, JJ.)
The iterations of this document are detailed infra note 213.
206. Letter from Justice Harold H. Burton to Justice Tom C. Clark, Regarding
Nos. 32, 22 & 20, Habeas Corpus (Jan. 16, 1953). Copies of this document and the
enclosed typescript opinion, are to be found in the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton
Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19.
207. For a brief sketch of Weisberg's later career, which culminated in appointment as a United States Magistrate Judge in Chicago in 1985, see Obituary,
Cm. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 17, 1994, at 3.
208. Memorandum from B[ernard] Wleisberg] to Mr. Justice [Clark]. This memorandum, to be found in the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University
of Texas at Austin, Box A19, is undated but, on the basis of the chronology set
forth in the text, was undoubtedly written sometime between January 23 and January 27, 1953.

1586

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 51:4:1541

when District Judges must hold hearings and how much weight
they had to give to prior state proceedings." ° As a stylistic
matter, "the reader is told... that he may discover the views of
the Court from this and Justice Reed's opinion 'jointly',"
but-although Justice Frankfurter had "the preferable position
on the procedural questions"---lower court readers were likely to
accept Justice Reed's formulations as authoritative since they
would be "presented as the opinion 'of the Court'."2 1 °
On January 27-the date of Justice Frankfurter's letter to
him objecting to the possible implication of Justice Reed's draft
that the federal judge could simply defer to the state outcome 2 11-Justice Burton wrote to Justice Clark, "It seems to
me that, with some minor changes in Felix's opinion, we could
afford to give weight to both of their opinions and encourage a
reconciliation of their meaning by using the draft of the memorandum of our views which I showed to you."212

209. Specifically, the unamended version of the passage that is quoted supra text
accompanying note 203, which cited in a footnote to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1948), quoted
in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 462 n.15 (1953) (providing that no federal judge is
required to entertain an application for habeas corpus if legality of detention has
been previously determined "by a judge or court of the United States," petition presents no new grounds, and "the judge or court is satisfied that the ends of justice
will not be served by such inquiry"), and to Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 231
(1924) (stating in dictum that a federal court has discretion to give conclusive
weight to denial by a federal court of federal prisoner's prior petition presenting
same claims), implied that a District Judge could deny a habeas corpus application
summarily simply on the grounds that the state courts had passed on the merits.
In his memorandum of December 31, supra note 180, at 3, Justice Frankfurter
had objected to this section:
We ought not to play hide-and-seek with so serious a subject as habeas
corpus touching State convictions by cloudy and confusing language as to what
we expect from the district judges. If we want them to treat a State disposition on the merits of Federal constitutional issues as res judicata, let us say
so. If we want such a disposition by a State court to be governed by the doctrine of Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224-a doctrine now put in statutory form
in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, applicable, as was the Salinger case, to successive applications before a Federal judge and not to an application from a State confinement to a Federal court in the first instance-let us say so. If we want to tell
the district judges that although the State adjudication is not res judicata,
technically speaking, and although § 2244 does not apply in terms, they
should at least as a general rule be guided by the spirit of res judicata,
barring only exceptional cases, let us say so.
210. Memorandum, supra note 209, at 1-2.
211. See supra text accompanying note 202.
212. Letter from Justice Harold H. Burton to Justice Tom C. Clark (Jan. 27,
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It may well be that Justice Reed's change, clearly removing
from the "opinion of the Court" any implication that prior state
dispositions would be preclusive,
was responsive to the concerns
21 3
of Justices Burton and Clark.
Regardless of its exact provenance, however, the meaning of
the change is clear and consistent with the thinking of all the
Justices except Jackson: 14 To the extent that the Justices focused on the substance of the inquiry to be made by the federal
habeas court, their effort was not to broaden it, but rather to
ensure that the published opinions would not be wrongly read as
narrowing it.
During the various interchanges between the Justices, Justice Jackson had been fairly silent (although it had been his
suggestion in conference that set Justices Frankfurter and Reed
off on their respective reports), 215 but by no means idle.
In March, 1952, Justice Jackson's law clerk, William
Rehnquist, wrote him a brief memo on the Ekberg case, concluding:

1953). A copy is in the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of
Texas at Austin, Box A19.
213. In any event, it succeeded in retaining their votes for Justice Reed's opinion.
As noted, the draft opinion sent by Justice Burton to Justice Clark on January 16, see supra text accompanying note 205, was identical to the one eventually
published, except that the draft concluded with: "They recognize also the propriety of
the considerations to which Mr. Justice Frankfurter, as well as Mr. Justice Reed,
invite the attention of a federal court when confronted with a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under circumstances comparable to those in the instant cases."
When this was circulated on January 30, it read: "[Tihey recognize the propriety of the other considerations to which MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE
FRANKFURTER invite the attention of a federal court when confronted with a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus under the circumstances stated." There is a copy of this
document in the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at
Austin, Box A19.
The published version, consistent with a second draft also circulated on January 30 and to be found in the same location, reads, "They also recognize the propriety of ihe considerations to which Mr. Justice Frankfurter invites the attention of a
federal court when confronted with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the
circumstances stated," Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 488 (1953) (opinion of Burton
& Clark, JJ.).
Thus, there was no substantive change. In all versions, the authors clearly
rejected the idea of giving any weight to the denial of certiorari and considered the
Reed and Frankfurter opinions to be consistent with each other on the remaining
procedural issues.
214. See infra text accompanying notes 215-54 (discussing Jackson).
215. See supra text accompanying note 124.
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In view of the generally troubled situation regarding habeas corpus in cases such as this, and also because the Court last week
granted cert in a case involving closely related questions (Daniels
v. Allen, No. 271 Misc, cert to CA 4),216 I append hereto a
sketchy survey of the law and the facts regarding habeas corpus
in the District Courts. On the basis of conclusions reached from
that material, I would recommend a grant here in order to consider it at the same time as No. 271, and perhaps straighten out the
law on the subject.217
The annexed memo is entitled, "HABEAS CORPUS, THEN
AND NOW, Or, 'If I Can Just Find the Right Judge, Over these
Prison Walls I shall Fly . .,:218
The basic problem is one of res judicata; to what extent does
an adverse judgment in the state system of cts preclude a petitioner from raising anew the same questions in federal district
court?
The Law.-Recent decisions of this court contain language
indicating that a federal district court may consider questions of
constitutional right anew even though the state court has decided
the same question adversely to the petitioner, and he has been
denied cert. by this court. This approach is based on two alternative rationales: (a) Where there has been a constitutional deprivation in the state ct, the result is to actually deprive that court of
jurisdiction; (b) habeas corpus represents an exception to orthodox
res judicata principles, and frankly allows a collateral attack on a
criminal conviction.
(a) a denial of due process by state cts ousts them of jurisdic-

216. This statement serves to date the document, which does not bear a date,
with some precision. Certiorari was granted in Daniels on March 3, 1952, Daniels v.
Allen, 342 U.S. 941 (1952), and in McGee on March 10, 1952, McGee v. Ekberg, 342
U.S. 952 (1952).
217. Certiorari Memorandum, McGee v. Ekberg, 342 U.S. 952 (1952) (No. 517,
O.T. 1951), Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, Legal File, Supreme
Court-O.T. 1952, Case Nos. 32, 22, 20, 31, Brown v. Allen, etc., Folder #2.
218. The document, bearing the notation Appendix to No. 517, is to be found
annexed to id. It has been previously noted in Saul Brenner, The Memos of Supreme
Court Law Clerk William Rehnquist: Conservative Tracts or Mirrors of his Justice's
Mind?, 76 JUDICATURE 77, 80-81 (1992) and David J. Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins,
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 6, 1996, at 65, 66. See also Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2343 (1993). See generally William H.
Rehnquist, Who Writes the Decisions of the Supreme Court?, 74 U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. 74 (1957). I have silently corrected some obvious typographical errors.
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tion. This novel concept was first advanced by Black, J, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458.219 Petitioner therein was convicted
in federal court and claimed a denial of counsel. The court said
that denial of counsel was a denial of constitutional right, and
that such denial was sufficient to oust the court of jurisdiction.
Since a judgment may always be attacked for want of jurisdiction
in the rendering court, this was no variation in the ordinary restriction of collateral attack. But of course the novelty lies in the
notion that denial of a right to counsel ousts the court of jurisdiction; previously jurisdiction had been confined to notions of
territoriality, statutory limitations, service and process, and notice.
However, novelty per se is not a condemnation, and my feeling is that this case, confined to its facts, is right. The reason for
prohibiting collateral attack is that a litigant has previously had
an opportunity to present his side of the case... But of course if
an accused has no counsel, this 'previous opportunity' is pretty
meaningless... and only a wooden application of the theory of
res judicata would foreclose petitioner.
But in succeeding cases there have been vague, uncritical
allusions to this case as establishing the principle that any denial
of constitutional due process goes to the jurisdiction of the court.
This is a horse of a different color. Questions of validity of indictment, makeup of the jury, validity of the statute under which
conviction is had, might all be questions of due process. But with
counsel, there is an opportunity to litigate these before an entire
system of state tribunals, and to petition this court for cert. to
review the judgment... Here the rationale for making an exception to ordinary restrictions of collateral attack ... is not present.
Litigation on due process and other constitutional questions must
end in the same manner as litigation on any other question.
(b) a frank exception is made in habeas corpus proceedings to
the rule of res judicata.The latest statement of this proposition is
found in the opinion of Reed, J., in Darr v. Burford, 339 US
200.2 ° ...

219. See supra note 163 (describing case). As indicated at id., Rehnquist's statement, like the argument built thereon, is simply wrong as a matter of law and

history. In American habeas corpus jurisprudence, the term "jurisdictional defect" has
never been restricted to the sorts of issues indicated in the final sentence of this
paragraph of text but has always meant "fundamental error". Compare Custis v.
United States, 511 U.S. 485, 494-96 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (restating his theory),

with id. at 508-10 (Souter, J., dissenting) (answering argument).
220. See supra Part IIA.1 (describing case).
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The early cases of Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, and
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, are vague in their language as to
the precise effect to be given a previous adjudication in the state
cts. In Frank, the writ was denied, the majority relying at least in
part on the previous state determination, although not expressly
calling it res judicata. 237 U.S. at 334. Moore seems to reject the
idea that res judicata governs, though again not in express language, on the grounds that the charge of mob domination, if true,
would be such as to actually oust the trial court of jurisdiction.
Thus the rationale for the decision might be said to be not that
res judicata did not apply, but that mob domination goes to the
jurisdiction of the court, and therefore under orthodox principles
collateral attack is permissible.
Recent cases have not clarified this rule.... [T]he important
question of the weight to be given to previous adjudication by
state courts has never been squarely decided recently, and language supporting any view can be found in the opinions.
The Practice.-With only such vague standards to guide
them.., confusion [reigns] in the lower courts.... Where the
District Judge has been receptive to claims of denial of due process presented in habeas corpus, and has not been disposed to
give much weight to previous state adjudication, egregious conflicts between the state and federal systems have resulted. 1
*

*

*

The rationale for this strangely disturbed state of affairs...
is apparently that the state courts do not adequately protect the
If the judgments of state courts were
rights of defendants ....
otherwise final, there might be good reason for this. But they are
subject to review here. All claims cannot be reviewed, but the few
that are may set a standard for the guidance of state cts in similar matters. To think that state cts would deliberately or in ignorance refuse to follow Supreme Court precedents is to suggest a
malady in the body politic which no additional hearing before a
federal judge would cure.
I respectfully submit that the Court would perform a signal
service to the federal system if they would lay down a rule which
required federal district judges to observe the ordinary principles

221. The next paragraph of the memorandum, elided here, discusses the Wells
litigation, described by Justice Jackson in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 n.11
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also infra note 231 and accompanying text.
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of res judicata in passing on habeas corpus petitions from those
confined under state sentence. An exception could be made for the
case where denial of the right of counsel made meaningless the
opportunity to litigate questions in the previous proceedings,
Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. But where the defendant has had counsel to argue all his points to the trial court, the state appellate
courts, and to petition this ct for cert, it seems to me the interest
in preserving some dignity in the state cts and in discouraging
utterly frivolous habeas corpus petitions ... outweigh[s] the extremely rare case where a more just result would be obtained by
allowing the district judge to re-examine matters already litigated
in the state ct. 2 This would [not] ... require outright overruling of any of this court's decisions on the matter, though the language in some would have to be limited.
When the Court returned in the fall of 1952, Rehnquist sent
Justice Jackson a memo entitled "HABEAS CORPUS, revisited"'
Having submitted a lengthy memo on this subject to you last
spring in connection with the cases that are to be re-argued, I
will not cover the same ground. You said the other day that you
thought the best policy would be to completely forget about precedent and write a new ticket. There are now, as you know, two
lines of activity in the court.
(1) Reed. From the compendious memo which he circulated at
the end of last term, 4 I think he regards this problem as basically the step to be taken after Darr v. Burford.... Reed...
seems to see.., only the further problem of "what weight must
be given to this ct's denial of cert"... [and] concludes that denial
of cert here must be given "respectful consideration" by the federal district ct. This contributes nothing positive except a new heading in the "Words and Phrases" volumes, and has the bad result
of an express invitation to confusion among the lower cts....
(2) FF. One of the clerks has been working most of the sum-

222. This position closely resembles the one that Bator later took. See Bator,
supra note 8, at 458; see also infra notes 229, 329.
223. The document is to be found in the Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of
Congress, Legal File, Supreme Court-O.T. 1952, Case Nos. 32, 22, 20, 31, Brown v.
Allen, etc., Folder #2. Again, obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected.
224. See supra text accompanying note 128. This reference indicates that
Rehnquist's memorandum was written prior to Justice Reed's circulation of September 26, 1952, see supra text accompanying note 141.
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mer on the problem, compiling a new set of statistics for what
presumably will be a bigger and better appendix.' The previous statistics given in Darr v. Burford showed that about 500
petitions from prisoners in state custody were disposed of each
year by the federal district cts, and that between 2 and 3% of
these resulted in the prisoners being released. FF drew the conclusion [that] since this percentage was low, there was no conflict
between state and federal systems. I submit that this conclusion
misses the point-in every one of the 500 cases where a petition
is disposed of, or at least those in which a return must be made,
the state judiciary is put on trial ......
FF's point about this ct not being a good one to handle matters such as this, because they are essentially [matters] of fact, is
well taken. But he proceeds to the conclusion that therefore the
federal district cts must be open to them. This conclusion is valid
only on the assumption that some federal court must be open to
allow prisoners to collaterally attack a state conviction. It rests on
the assumption that both history and policy make it desirable to
make a special exception to the ordinary rules of res judicata....
Until 1867, only federal prisoners could use
(a) History ....
HC in federal cts, and then only to attack the validity of commitment papers. When speaking loosely of the "broad scope of the
great writ" it is well to remember that classical expressions on
the subject dealt with England, where there is unitary jurisdiction." Our problem is present here only because of the difference between the US and England-here the states have primary
jurisdiction to punish criminals.

225. This reference supports the dating proposed supra note 224 by making clear
that Rehnquist's memorandum was, in any event, written before Justice
Frankfurter's circulation of October 13, 1952, see supra text accompanying note 146.
The law clerk working on the project was Donald T. Trautman, see Brown v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 514 n.2 (1953) (appendix to opinion of Frankfurter, J.), later a professor at Harvard Law School, see Obituary, Donald T. Trautman, Professor at Harvard
Law School; at 69, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 22, 1993, at 73.
226. For the form in which Justice Jackson ultimately incorporated this thought
into his opinion, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
227. But cf. Freedman, supra note 168, at 536-37, 595-600 (disputing this proposition and presenting contrary authority).
228. But cf. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.)
("The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law,
the great object of which is, the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without
sufficient cause. It is in the nature of a writ of error, to examine the legality of the
commitment.").
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(b) Policy. One need only to venture out into the halls of this
Honorable Court to hear ringing phrases to the effect that
[where] liberty is at stake, traditional rules ought not to apply. I
suggest that the only question really involved is, "Is this the kind
of job that the federal cts can do better than the state
cts?" ' ... [This is not a situation where] the claim of one state
will necessarily exclude the claim of another state, or of the federal government.... This is not to say that there should be no federal standards of due process, but only that we should trust the
state cts to enforce them, as we do other federal standards.
The above is simply added reason for my hearty concurrence
in your statement of last week that, whereas [the] denial of cert
should not be held to approve the application of the law by the cts
below in the sense of stare decisis, it should be res judicata so far
as any further federal intervention in the case is concerned. Perhaps... exception[s] should be made where ptr has been denied
counsel... [and] for actual newly discovered evidence, raising
questions which ptr did not and could not have litigated in the
state proceeding. Apart from these two, apply your rule of res
judicata-and no mealy mouthed talk about "respectful consideration" which would only confuse the lower cts.
While the ACLU probably would not agree, I think that this
is the forward looking approach to the problem. For many years
this ct exercised a strict supervision over state economic legislation, rate-making, etc. That day is now gone.... But [the] very
factions which most loudly damned the old court for its position
on property rights are the most vocal in urging that this ct and
other federal cts strictly supervise the state cts on matters of
"civil liberties" and procedural due process. This inconsistency is
apparently justified on some preferred position theory. What
these forces fail to recognize is that the vice of the old court was
not that it imposed the wrong views on the states, but that it
imposed any views at all. In the fields of liberty as well as property, the states must be left to work out their own destinies within
broad limits. If innocent people are regularly sent to jail, this ct
or other federal cts may intervene; but subject to that limitation,
there is no more reason for making this ct or other federal cts
into a "super legal-aid society" than there was for elevating the
doctrine of freedom of contract into a constitutional principle. For

229. Bator eventually made exactly this argument in his article. See Bator, supra
note 8, at 441-54, which, as suggested infra note 329, is perhaps a further reason

that his views on Brown found Rehnquist's ear receptive.
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this ct to relax the federal grip on state criminal justice would be
[a] step in the same direction as was taken by the case which
overruled Lochner v. New York.
Lastly, may I humbly state my hope that the opinion of the
ct in these cases will be yours. Reed is so bogged down in precedent that he will be unable to reach an unequivocal result that is
acceptable to either side. FF ... is one who must set down in the
opinion every nuance that comes to mind. This makes for great
erudition but often damn poor law. What this problem needs is an
incisive statement of new law....
WRITE!!!
Around October 1, 1952, Rehnquist sent a memo headed
"To: The Boss Re: Habeas Corpus.""' Responding to Justice
Reed's circulation in Brown v. Allen dated September 26,
Rehnquist wrote that the alternatives seemed to shape up as follows:
(1) Reed
(a) previous adjudication in state cts, without more, not binding, and not even necessary to be considered
(b) previous adjudication in state cts, followed by denial of
cert here-not binding upon DC, but may be "considered"
(c) Darrv. Burford, requiring petition for cert here as part of
exhaustion of remedies, remains in effect.
Criticisms:
(a) Still pretty vague, because so enmeshed in precedents:
what does "consideration" mean to the District Judge?
(b) Still does not strike at the small minority of federal judges, such as Goodman, who are causing trouble,"' since they are

230. This is to be found in the Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress,
Legal File, Supreme Court--O.T. 1952, Case Nos. 32, 22, 20, 31, Brown v. Allen,
etc., Folder #2.
The document is undated, so the dating given in the text is conjectural, but
for the following reasons, I believe it to be correct within a few days. The document
begins "Reed, J, circulated this yesterday afternoon" and describes material appearing at "p. 6-8 of Stanley's memo." Id. at 1-2. That material appears in the indicated
location of Justice Reed's memorandum in Brown v. Allen, dated September 26,
1952, see supra text accompanying note 141, a Friday. Justice Clark's copy of that
memorandum, found in the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of
Texas at Austin, Box A19, bears a pencil annotation indicating its receipt on September 30, 1952. On the assumption that all chambers received the circulation on
that day, Rehnquist was writing on October 1, 1952.
231. The reference is to Judge Louis E. Goodman of the Northern District of California, who sat on the Wells case, see supra note 221.
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apparently free to disregard previous adjudication if they so desire.
2
(2) Felix (as I piece it together from his clerks)
(a) neither previous state adjudication nor denial of cert here
have any weight whatever
(b) Darr v. Burford overruled;' result is to transfer this

Following the publication of the initial print of the Brown v. Allen opinion on
February 9, 1953, Judge Goodman wrote Justice Jackson a letter referring to note
11 of his opinion and saying that, as "one of the first judges who, in published
writings, called attention to the mounting abuse of the writ," he was "somewhat
shocked to find myself, not by name of course, singled out as an aider of abusive
habeas corpus practice"; he urged that his conduct had been entirely in accord with
governing Circuit and Supreme Court authority. See Letter from Louis E. Goodman
to Robert H. Jackson (Feb. 16, 1953), Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, Legal File, Supreme Court-O.T. 1952, Case Nos. 32, 22, 20, 31, Brown v.
Allen, etc., Folder #3.
Justice Jackson replied: "I think the footnote to which you call my attention
unconsciously does you an injustice. Fortunately, the Reporter's Office had not prepared the final text for the United States Reports, and I am adding to the footnote,
after the citation of the Wells case, the following:
"The opinions of the District Judge show that he was well aware of the difficulties presented by the procedure, but felt he had no alternative in the light
of this Court's decisions. Indeed, he has contributed the lessons of his own
experience in this field in Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313."
Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Louis E. Goodman (Feb. 19, 1953), Robert H.
Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, Legal File, Supreme Court-O.T. 1952, Case
Nos. 32, 22, 20, 31, Brown v. Allen, etc., Folder #3.
During World War II, Judge Goodman had dismissed on due process grounds
the prosecution for draft resistance of 26 American citizens of Japanese descent who
were at the time interned in California relocation camps. United States v.
Kuwabara, 56 F. Supp. 716, 717-19 (N.D. Cal. 1944). The story has recently been
told in Eric L. Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1428-32
(1999), where the action of the "courageous judge" is presented as evidence that "the
judicial record on civil liberties in wartime is a good deal more complex than the
rather simple case," id. at 1432, presented by Chief Justice Rehnquist in WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE (1998).
232. This reference is consistent with the dating suggested supra note 230, since
it implies that the document was written before Justice Frankfurter laid out his
views in his memorandum of October 13, 1952. See supra text accompanying notes
149-53.
233. If, as is plausible, this is what Justice Frankfurter wished to do, see supra
text accompanying note 138 (implying a desire to revisit Darr), he did not so indicate in his formal circulations. As recounted above, these did not seek to persuade
the brethren to abandon the requirement that would-be habeas petitioners first file a
certiorari petition, but only to insure that the denials of such petitions would not be
given any substantive effect. This is consistent with the approach that both Justice
Reed and Justice Jackson took in modifying their various drafts; all the Justices
made substantial efforts to moderate positions that they knew lacked internal sup-
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kind of litigation almost entirely to [the] lower federal cts, which
he says are far more capable of handling it than we [] are.
Criticisms:
This in effect sets a one judge district ct as a reviewing tribunal
for the highest ct of the state in criminal matters. A state ct is
not a ct of last resort, but simply one intermediate step in a series of interminable appeals....
(3) Suggestions to Restrict Collateral Attack other than Reed's
(a) Previous litigation in state cts on merits, followed by
denial of cert here, is res judicata though not stare decisis. This is
your idea and I think it far superior to any of the above.... Darr
v. Burford 4 would have to be retained in order to prevent prisoners from circumventing the effect of this rule by not petitioning
for cert.
(b) Accept Judge Parker's construction of "exhaustion of remedies" provision (8 FRD 171), rejected by Stanley, to the effect
that in any state where habeas corpus is not res judicata, state
remedies are always available." s Ptr could seek cert to review
these collateral attacks in the state cts, but lower federal cts
would not be available. Thus the unseemly conflict between coordinate courts would be eliminated, and yet a federal avenue
would remain open for the exceptional case....
(c) A less forthright method for cutting down this kind of
litigation would be based on the fact that almost without ] exception these petitions to the federal ct are in forma [pauperis]....
[T]he federal cts have always required.., a certificate of probable cause [for such litigants to take appeals]. The rule could be
laid down that where the contention overruled by the federal
district ct has also been decided against him on the merits in the
state proceedings, there is as a matter of law no probable
cause.... [Thus,] (1) no prisoner who lost in the DC could appeal
(2) the DCs themselves would feel freer in dealing with the petitions, since there would be no review of a decision adverse to the

port.
234. Next to this paragraph, Justice Jackson wrote "yes."
235. Next to this paragraph, Justice Jackson wrote 'yes." He incorporated the
thought in an early draft of his opinion, see infra text accompanying note 248, but
abandoned it thereafter. As indicated in the next sentences of text, the consequence
of its adoption would have been that, in a state permitting successive post-conviction
filings in state court, the prisoner would never be able to file a federal habeas corpus in district court--only a petition seeking certiorari from the denial of state remedies. The treatment of this issue by the rest of the Court has been described supra
text accompanying notes 142-45.
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(d) Adopt a new policy on certs in
When the contention raised is, in the
state grounds which would preclude
ny with the notation "with 7prejudice
for federal habeas corpus".1

1597

this ct [on direct appeals].
opinion of six judges, free of
review," 6 this ct should deto the right to bring action

It is not clear when Justice Jackson decided that he would
write an opinion (although it was in all likelihood after the conference of October 27, 1952).' But once he did, his first step
was to draft himself an extensive set of handwritten notes,
headed "Habeas Corpus." 9 Although these contain a number
236. This appears to mean, "when the vote to deny certiorari is not based on the
existence of adequate and independent state grounds."
See Letter from William 0. Douglas to Jerome N. Frank (Sept. 27, 1956)
("You state in your letter [of September 11 about pending habeas corpus legislation,
see infra text accompanying note 299] that you assume we are too busy to scrutinize
carefully all the certs coming to us from State courts denying relief. I do not think
that is true. We look at all these things very closely. The difficulty is that there are
often persuasive grounds for believing that the State court judgment rests on an
adequate State ground. Some here are sticklers on that point. Others of us are more
liberal in that regard. But nonetheless a lot of cases get impaled on that barrier. So
we do not get to the merits. That leaves open the avenue of relief through the Federal courts."). Copies of both letters are to be found in the William 0. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 583, Habeas Corpus Law Folder.
237. Justice Jackson never gave serious consideration to this suggestion, consistently maintaining his view, see infra page 1601, that habeas corpus was the appropriate vehicle for the assertion of errors that did not and could not have been made
part of the record before the Court on certiorari. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
546-47 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result). Cf. Coleman v. Balkcom, 451
U.S. 949, 956-57, 963 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
(proposing that the Court grant certiorari from the state court's denial of post-conviction relief in a capital case where "the issues presented are not substantial" and
petitioner has not "made any showing in the Georgia courts that he was deprived of
any rights secured to him by the United States Constitution" so "that this Court
may deal with all of petitioner's claims on their merits" and thereby preclude federal
habeas review should the petitioner lose); Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1543
(11th Cir. 1985) (granting petitioner federal habeas relief), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164
(1986).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 159-64 (describing conference). The inference regarding timing is based on the fact that no typed draft emerged until December, see infra text accompanying note 241, and the hypothesis that it would be inefficient to begin working on such a project until after one heard the views' of the
brethren in conference. In addition, the notes described infra text accompanying
notes 239-40 contain the Justice's research responding to the point: "FF says Frank
v Magnum and Moore v Dempsey [are] authority for considering on h.c. same issue
as on cert.," and so were written at some point after Justice Jackson had heard this
from Justice Frankfurter.
239. Opinion notes regarding Habeas Corpus, Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library
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of thoughts that eventually found their way into his ultimate
opinion, they also contain criticisms of the existing system that
might have led him to voice significantly more radical views,
e.g., "Abolishing states in interest of civil liberties";
"Any old key good enough to open jail doors. Presume innocent
& court guilty of miscarriage";
"H.C. a judicial plaything in [a] game without rules";
"Rights of state v. individual-contrastindividual elsewhere
Govt. v taxpayer-regulated-controlledBut in criminal law tie hands society-free accused. 'never had it
so good'". 4 °
Justice Jackson next produced several dated typescript
drafts of an opinion, none of which he circulated. While showing
significant variations, these display a pronounced trend towards
narrowing and softening the legal propositions asserted and a
shift in focus from matters of substantive due process law to
matters of habeas corpus procedure.
241
The draft of December 29, 1952 states:
It is my belief that our greatest need is not to try to cite or
apply the recent decisions on this subject but rather to clear the
site of many of them and to look forward rather than backward
for our remedy. The only usefulness I find in most of our recent
procedural precedents on this subject is that they teach us how it
came about that these abuses assume such proportions .... "'
I can not exonerate the state courts from some responsibility
for the extension of federal interference. One is sometimes
shocked at the callousness with which the rights of defendants
are treated, particularly where the defendant happened to be of
particularly unpopular groups in the locality. We cannot claim
either that federal justice is free of that. But it has been lawless
procedures and savage penalties which were discreditable to the
of Congress, Legal File, Supreme Court-O.T. 1952, Case Nos. 32, 22, 20, 31, Brown
v. Allen, etc., Folder #1.
240. Id.
241. Draft Opinion, Nos. 20, 22, 31 & 32 (dated Dec. 29), Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, Legal File, Supreme Court-O.T. 1952, Case Nos. 32, 22,
20, 31, Brown v. Allen, etc., Folder #2. Like all of his notes and drafts, this one
appears to be Justice Jackson's own work, with only tangential incorporation of
Rehnquist's ideas and research.
242. The paragraph omitted at this point consists substantially verbatim of the
Rehnquist paragraph labeled "History" that is quoted supra text accompanying note
227.
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profession that originally moved the federal government into the
state field.... [T]here were.., cases of obtaining confession by
the most brutal third degree methods of criminal and physical
abuse of the person and by acts of terrorism which, given jurisdiction, no decent court could condone. There were instances of
virtual denial of counsel to the accused and there were flagrant
violations in some parts of the country of the federal statute
which prohibits discrimination of a racial character in the selection of juries.
These decisions, however.., have left the boundaries of
federal power to interfere and of the grounds upon which interference may be based so vague and indefinite that no prisoner is
wholly without hope of release if he can only get his case
here....
A considerable part of the vagueness of the effect of the
Fourteenth Amendment on state trials is inherent in the subject
as indicated by previous decisions. For example the Moore v.
Dempsey, doctrine that a trial must be fair and not a mask or a
form. With the development of modern methods of publicity.., it
is almost impossible to say when a fair trial has been had....
[Exclusion of a confession] in order not to prejudice the jury is
utterly unavailing if at his dinner table ... [a potential juror]
hears the content of that confession recited over the radio perhaps with extortions [sic] to suit the predilections of the commentator. We have stripped, by our interpretation of the same amendment, the state courts of power to protect the processes of fair
trial against this kind of intrusion. I am frank to say that I do
not know whether any highly publicized trial today, state or federal, could bear the scrutiny indicated in Moore v. Dempsey

[Additionally,] we have really reached the point where any
case in which a confession is used may present a constitutional
question and I again would be unable to say what questioning of
a suspect would be permitted. Also, we have gone beyond the
federal statute which prohibits racial discrimination in the selection of jurors and have entertained cases in which a strong minority have indicated that it is even unconstitutional for a state
to attempt to select jurors on the basis of their intelligence. In
Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, by a feat of interpretation the
Court expanded the right to have counsel in a federal case to
mean the right to be furnished counsel ... [,which] left the whole
question of the right to counsel in state court trials uncertain.
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Moreover there was talk in many of the opinions about the right
to effective counsel ....

The result is that we have not only a

number of appeals by persons who have been convicted of minor
offenses where they apparently did not have counsel, but we also
have a large number of cases in which the prisoner admittedly
had counsel but the claim is made that he was not effective....
Another prolific source of litigation by habeas corpus has
been the so-called McNabb Rule, the rule requiring immediate or
semi-immediate arraignment of a prisoner after his arrest. A rule
which was adopted only for federal courts and not as a constitutional matter, but in which prisoners see constitutional possibilities of its application against the state.243
Only after this 10-page attack on the substance of contemporary
due process doctrine in the criminal procedure field, does the
draft turn to matters of federal habeas corpus procedure.2 44 Although it here resembles more closely the discussion of the same
subjects in his ultimate opinion,245 the tone in the draft is notably sharper, describing "lawlessness in procedure run riot," a
situation in which "there are no rules. And habeas corpus has
become pretty nearly a judicial plaything in a game without
rules."248 Specifically, on the issue of the effect of the denial of
certiorari:
It is true that no one outside of the Court and often those
inside it do not know all of the reasons which cause six members
to withhold their consent to review. Some may think the judgment below is right, others that it is wrong but of no general
importance to the law, while another may believe the record not
clear, that the question was [not]247 raised or preserved and still
another, [may] think the docket is sufficiently large already and
wants to be off on vacation. One may even think that the question is presented and is important and is wrongly decided but still
vote against grant of certiorari in fear that the ultimate decision
of his brethren would strengthen or extend what he regards as a

243. Draft Opinion, supra note 241, at 1-10.
244. Cf. Yackle, supra note 218, at 2349 (noting a shift in concerns of habeas
opponents from matters regarding allocation of business between state and federal
courts to substantive disagreement with the Court's criminal procedure rulings).
245. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540-48 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in
the result).
246. Draft Opinion, supra note 241, at 11-12.
247. This word is not in the original document; the interpolation is purely mine.
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bad rule....
But denial of certiorari does have all the meaning in the
world in applying the doctrine of res judicata to the particular
case in which it issues. It leaves standing unimpaired a final
judgment which, under any rational theory of the law, is conclusive against collateral attack as to the issues it settles or could
have settled had the parties raised them....
Habeas Corpus goes to matters that are not apparent on the
record itself. This distinction has been cavalierly cast aside in
recent decisions of this court and is responsible for no small part
of our present difficulty....
At the risk of being a reactionary, I would revert to the former rules governing habeas corpus and certiorari. We must not
forget that these rules were deemed necessary to protect it from
abuse by men who took far more risks than we do to grant the
writ at all. We often pay them lip service and then honor them in
the breach....
No petition should be entertained to raise a question which
was reviewed or could have been reviewed by appeal or other
process. The disregard of this old and rational limitation has
caused no end of mischief.... Frequently no appeals are taken .... In other cases an appeal is attempted but defaults occur.... Then there are the cases in which the prisoner does appeal and does obtain from the state courts a review of his case.
What possible excuse can there be for allowing the prisoner to
then renew the struggle in federal court. In effect, to transfer his
case on the same questions from the state courts, which [have]
the primary function of enforcing the criminal law, to a federal
judge on collateral attack upon the convictions. There is little that
I can add except hearty approval to Judge Parker's comment on
this subject 8 F.R.D. 171.8 I think that his views would end
unseemly conflict between coordinate courts and yet a federal
avenue would remain open for the exceptional case in which the
state judges have been led to violate constitutional rights.
Criminal law.., is in disrepute and it is in many respects a
disgrace to the profession ....

A strong contributing factor to this

is the law's delays, the fact that penalties are never really effective so long as the public is interested in the case. There is a
great to-do about indictment and about conviction and then begin

248. As indicated, supra note 235, and consistent with the progression of his
drafts towards more moderate views, Justice Jackson deleted this suggestion from
later drafts; see also infra note 252.
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a series of appeals to intermediate courts, to courts of last resort,
to this Court and then there are applications for rehearings in
each of those courts and then when that is at an end, the whole
process is started over again by writ of habeas corpus, habeas
corpus in state courts, habeas corpus in the federal courts, appeals, rehearings, petitions for certiorari, petitions for rehearing
on denial of petitions for certiorari. The whole thing is disgusting
and a disgrace to the profession. Moderate penalties promptly and
effectively applied after fair and calm trial reviewable once to
make sure that no prejudicial error has occurred is all that a
defendant, in my opinion, is entitled to. When he has had that,
society is
entitled to have the decrees of its courts enforced with
249
finality.

The Justice's next draft, of January 5, 1953,25 was structurally distinctly different.21 But it, too, while overlapping
with the final version, differed from it in being far stronger in
tone and substance:
The generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment... provided
a basis for the judicial expansion of the substantive law of habeas
corpus on the premise that they are violations of due process of

Draft opinion, supra note 241, at 13-20.
Justice Rehnquist's proposal in his opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 956 (1981), described supra note 237, was
motivated by similar concerns:
[Tihe existence of the death penalty in this country is virtually an illusion.
Since 1976, hundreds of juries have sentenced hundreds of persons to
death, . . . yet virtually nothing happens except endlessly drawn out legal
proceedings. ...
I do not think that this Court can continue to evade some
responsibility for this mockery of our criminal justice system. . . . [T]his
Court . . . has made it virtually impossible for States to enforce with reasonable promptness their constitutionally valid capital punishment statutes. When
society promises to punish by death certain criminal conduct, and then the
courts fail to do so, . . . they undermine the integrity of the entire criminal
justice system.
Coleman, 451 U.S. at 957-59.
250. Draft Opinion, Nos. 20, 22, 31 & 32 (dated Jan. 5, 1953), Robert H. Jackson
Papers, Library of Congress, Legal File, Supreme Court-O.T. 1952, Case Nos. 32, 22,
20, 31, Brown v. Allen, etc., Folder #3.
251. Most obviously, it deleted the long introductory attack on the substance of
contemporary due process jurisprudence in the criminal procedure field, see supra
text accompanying note 243, although, as will be seen below, remnants of the
thought persisted for the nonce. But the overall focus of this draft, most of which is
not quoted here because of its similarity to the ultimate opinion, is on habeas corpus procedure as such.
249.
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law.... [W]hen we dislike any particular practice or irregularity
sufficiently we can read into the Fourteenth Amendment a Constitutional prohibition of it and it thereby becomes correctable by
habeas corpus. Both the courts and the profession are too familiar
with this expanding concept in this field to require detailed citations or discussions of cases. While in every other field, such as
taxation, regulation of business, control of activities, the power of
the state over the individual has been expanded. The trend of
recent times has been to limit the right of the state to enforce its
criminal judgments against the individual unless those judgments
in all respects meet the approval of the last federal judges to pass
upon them....
That there has been a simultaneous trend away from an
effort by this Court to enforce a rule of law in favor of a practice
of deciding by the personal notions of justice of a majority of the
judges is the belief of the profession and I must say I share it....
[The profession's view is] that we have no fixed principles and
that any defendant may stand a chance of getting his liberty if he
can only get his case in federal court.
In seeking a way out of this bog, it is important to distinguish what is practicable from what is impossible. Gallant tilting
at windmills is a pastime for judges no less ridiculous than for
knights. Even if it were desirable it is too late in the day, barring
some such public storm as was raised by President Roosevelt's
plan to reorganize this Court, which accompanied the retreat
from the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to restrict state legislation in the economic field, to now reverse the course of interpretation which warrants all manner of interference in the states'
action in the criminal field. 2
Reorganizing his material once more, Justice Jackson produced another private draft on January 13," which largely
tracks his eventual published opinion in its legal rulings and

252. Draft Opinion, supra note 250, at 1-3, 7-8. Noting the shallow roots of Darr
v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), see supra text accompanying notes 41-42, the opinion also contains a proposal, later dropped, that the prisoner be given the option of
either seeking certiorari from the highest state court (and be precluded by an adverse result from seeking habeas corpus) or foregoing certiorari at that point and
applying to the federal district court for habeas corpus. See Draft Opinion, supra, at
11.
253. Draft Opinion, Nos. 20, 22, 31 & 32 (dated Jan. 13), Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, Legal File, Supreme Court-O.T. 1952, Case Nos. 32, 22,
20, 31, Brown v. Allen, etc., Folder #3.
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language. On January 28, he finally circulated an opinion; it
entered the U.S. Reports without substantial change. 2"
Following Justice Frankfurter's circulation of his opinion on
the merits on February 5,255 the full set of opinions was duly
released on February 9, 1953.
C. The Dispositions
The Court's published decision dealt with two procedural
topics. First, it ruled five-to-four that a previous denial of certiorari was to be given no substantive effect by the judge ruling on
a later federal habeas corpus petition.2 56
Second, it reiterated the long-established law that, in determining whether a state conviction violated the Constitution, a

254. Among the surviving copies is one in the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law
Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19.
As may be seen in the Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, Legal File, Supreme Court-O.T. 1952, Case Nos. 32, 22, 20, 31, Brown v. Allen, etc., Folder #3,
Justice Frankfurter attempted, in an informal note (probably of January 28, 1953)
asking Justice Jackson to detail his disagreements, in a letter dated January 29,
1953, and through marginal comments on the circulated draft, to persuade Justice
Jackson to modify the views stated in his opinion. These efforts were unavailing.
The only response Justice Frankfurter received from Justice Jackson was a note
replying to the first one, which read in full:
FF. I can give the answer in short form
Yours is too damned gentle-I want to make it
hurt.
Bob
This document is to be found in the Felix Frankfurter Papers, supra note 14, Part I,
Reel 66, Frame 00028.
But just as Justice Frankfurter was unable to convince Justice Jackson, so
must it have been clear to Justice Jackson that he himself would be highly unlikely
to persuade any of the others-and, indeed, there is no written record of his having
tried to do so. As indicated in the text, he simply circulated his opinion and promptly filed it.
255. There is a copy in the Tom C. Clark Papers, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas at Austin, Box A19.
256. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 497 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
(expressing the "position of the majority upon that point," Brown, 344 U.S. at 452).
It thus rejected "the position of the Fourth Circuit," id. at 491, which has been
described supra note 93. The section of Justice Reed's opinion for the Court stating
the minority viewpoint on this issue, see Brown, 344 U.S. at 456-57, had the support
of Justice Minton and Chief Justice Vinson, see supra note 40, who did not write
separately. Justice Jackson urged a broader rule of preclusion, see Brown, 344 U.S.
at 543-45 (Jackson, J., concurring), which would have foreclosed the petitioners before the Court.
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federal habeas corpus court should, after consideration of the
state court record, decide what further factual inquiries were
needed in order to discharge responsibly its duty to make an
independent determination of federal law, a decision that would
be given a large measure of deference. 7 While contained in
two opinions (reflecting the inability of Justices Reed and Frankfurter to agree upon a single draft) all the Justices but Jackson
were in accord on this second set of procedural issues.2'
257. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 463-64 (opinion of the Court per Reed, J.), id. at
500 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Cf. Freedman, supra note 22, at 1533-34 (tracing
this rule to Frank).
Justice Frankfurter's published discussion of the procedural issues tracked his
earlier internal writing, see supra note 153, both on the matter of the record for
federal habeas corpus adjudication, see Brown v. Allen, 334 U.S. 443, 503-04 (1953)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.), and in elaborating upon the established distinctions
between earlier state rulings on:
(a) questions of historical fact (which the federal judge could accept as binding
"[u]nless a vital flaw be found in the process of ascertaining such facts"), Brown, 334
U.S. at 506,
(b) "questions of law [which] cannot, under the habeas corpus statute, be accepted
as binding," since "[i]t is precisely these questions that the federal judge is commanded to decide," id., and
(c) "mixed questions or the application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found," where "the duty of adjudication [rests] with the federal judge," and "[t]he
State court cannot have the last say when it, though on fair consideration and what
procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional
right." Id. at 507-08.
Justice Reed's opinion, although more oblique, agreed. See id. at 463-65.
The current Court continues to apply this framework. See Thompson v.
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102 (1995).
258. That there was no real disagreement between Justices Reed and Frankfurter
respecting hearings-so that indeed "[t]he views of the Court on these questions may
thus be drawn from the two opinions jointly," Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 444, 497
(1953) is shown by the fact that no Justice believed that the district courts in the
cases at hand had been required to conduct de novo review of the factual findings of
the state courts regarding whether confessions had been coerced or a petitioner was
sane. See infra note 262; text accompanying notes 279, 310-13. Thus, the opinion not
only made no new law on the scope of review, see supra text accompanying notes
33-35, but also did not do so on the issue of when hearings were mandatory.
At the same time, as described infra note 265, Justice Reed pointedly approved of the decision of the Speller district court to exercise its well-established
discretion to conduct a hearing into how North Carolina selected juries. See Brown,
344 U.S. at 478; supra note 101 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying
note 326.
In short, Justice Frankfurter was accurate in reporting- "The issue of the
significance of the denial of certiorari raises a sharp division in the Court. This is
not so as to the bearing of the proceedings in the State courts upon the disposition
of the application for a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Courts." Brown,
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On the merits of the cases decided in the Brown opinion,"
on the other hand, the Justices were sharply at odds. Justice
Reed wrote for himself and Justices Vinson, Minton, Burton,
Clark and Jackson in denying all relief. Justice Black's dissent
was joined by Justice Douglas, while Justice Frankfurter's was
joined by those two Justices.
In Brown, the Court focused principally on the challenge to
the jury selection procedures and held that the use of tax lists as
the basis of selection for grand and petit jurors was not unconstitutionally racially discriminatory, notwithstanding the racially unequal distribution of wealth, the resulting disparate impact
on the composition of the jury pool, and North Carolina's history
of unconstitutional discrimination in jury selection.2" Nor did
the Court's terse review of the record respecting the confession
persuade it that the statement had been involuntary.2 61
Both dissents discussed primarily the jury selection issue.262 Justice Black concluded that there had not been a "genuine abandonment of [the] old discriminatory practices."2" Justice Frankfurter focused his fire on the impropriety of an affirmance in a case where the court of appeals had-wrongly, as the
Court now held-declined to reach the merits in deference to the
prior proceedings. 2"
344 U.S. at 497.
259. That is, Brown, Speller and Daniels, see supra text accompanying notes 84119 (describing cases); as indicated supra text accompanying note 48, Smith v. Baldi
was decided in a separate published opinion, United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi,
344 U.S. 561 (1953), which is discussed infra text accompanying notes 274-83.
260. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 467-74 (1953).
261. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 475-76.
262. This is probably because under the procedural formulations of both Justice
Frankfurter, see id. at 504-08 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), and Justice Black, see id.
at 554 (Black, J., dissenting), the confession issue was one on which the district
court might properly have deferred to the state's factual findings-in which case, its
ultimate legal conclusion that the confession was voluntary would have been difficult
to cast as reversible error. Cf. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949) (reviewing
capital murder conviction on direct appeal, the Court, accepting the state's version of
what events occurred, reverses on basis of coerced confession; Frankfurter, J. observes that "there comes a point where this Court should not be ignorant as judges
of what we know as men").
263. Brown, 344 U.S. at 551 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black took a similar
approach to Speller, adding that, unlike the majority, see infra text accompanying
note 266, he would consider on the merits the challenge to a wealth-based jury
selection system. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 551-52.
264. See id. at 556 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); supra note 256; see also supra
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The Court disposed of Speller similarly.265 It refused to
consider the additional argument that, quite apart from race,
wealth discrimination in jury selection was impermissible. This
claim had not been asserted below, and "[s]uch an important national asset as state autonomy in local law enforcement must
not be eroded through indefinite charges of unconstitutional
actions. 26
As to Daniels, the Court rested its affirmance on counsel
having been one day late in serving the appeals papers. 26 7 "To
allow habeas corpus in such circumstances would subvert the
entire system of state criminal justice and destroy state energy
in the detection and punishment of crime."2 Justice Black responded: "State systems are not so feeble."2 69 Justice Frankfurter wrote that-in light of the strength of the petitioners' underlying claims 27°--the refusal of the North Carolina Supreme
Court to exercise its discretion to review the merits had resulted
in a "complete ... miscarriage of justice."27 '
The real-world outcomes of these dispositions were four
executions. Within a few months, Brown and Speller were put to
death in the gas chamber simultaneously, 272 as were the
Daniels cousins later in the year. 73

note 93 (describing the court of appeals' disposition). Since the court of appeals had
decided Speller in the same opinion as Brown, see supra note 93, Justice Frankfurter labeled this section of his merits dissent as applicable to Speller as well. See

Brown, 344 U.S. at 554-55.
265. It noted, however, that in this case the district court had held a hearing,
see supra note 101 and accompanying text, and specifically observed:
This was in its discretion. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86; Darr v. Burford,

339 U.S. 214, cases which establish the power of federal district courts to protect the constitutional rights of state prisoners after the exhaustion of state
remedies. It better enabled that court to determine whether any violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment occurred.

Brown, 344 U.S. at 478.
266. Brown, 344 U.S. at 480-81.
267. See supra text accompanying note 108.
268. Brown, 344 U.S. at 485.
269. Id. at 553 (Black, J., dissenting). He then continued with the passage quoted
supra text accompanying note 200.
270. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
271. Brown, 344 U.S. at 559 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
272. See Barron Mills, Clyde Brown, Speller Pay With Lives for Crimes, WINSTON-

SALEM J., May 30, 1953, at 1.
273. See Cousins Die In Gas Chamber For Killing Pitt Cab Driver, THE NEWS
and OBSERVER [Raleigh, N.C.], Nov. 7, 1953, at 1.
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The decision in the companion case of Smith v. Baldi274
followed a similar pattern, albeit with less fatal consequences.
Again, the Court was unanimous on the issues of habeas corpus
procedure.2 75
Smith argued that he was insane, that an insane person
could not constitutionally be executed, and that he was entitled
to a federal court hearing on whether he was in fact insane.276
Rejecting this claim of entitlement, the Court quoted with
approval the district court's statement that only if
special circumstances prevail, should the lowest federal court
reverse the highest state court in cases where the constitutional
issues have been disposed on the merits by the highest state
court in an opinion specifically setting forth its reasons that there
has been no denial of due process of law, and where the record
before the state court and the allegations in the petition for the
writ before the federal court fail to disclose that the state in its
prosecution departed from the constitutional requirements. That
is this case.277
The Court then continued:
This view of the proceedings accords with our holding in the
Brown case, supra. As the trial and appellate State court records
which were before the District Court show a judicial hearing,
where on the plea of guilty the question of sanity at the time of
the commission of the crime was canvassed, the sentence does not
violate due process. 7 '
The dissent, written by Justice Frankfurter for himself and
Justices Douglas and Black, specifically agreed that "[i]t is not
for this Court to find a want of due process in a conviction for
murder sustained by the highest court of the State merely because a finding that the defendant is sane may raise the gravest

274. 344 U.S. 561 (1953). See supra text accompanying notes 48-71 (describing
the background of case).
275. See Smith, 344 U.S. at 565. The Court was also unanimous in rejecting
Smith's substantive claim that he had a constitutional right to the appointment of a
psychiatrist. Id. at 568. This decision was repudiated in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68, 85 (1985). Justice Rehnquist dissented.
276. Smith, 344 U.S. at 568-69.
277. Id. at 569-70 (quoting United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 96 F. Supp. 100,
103 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (described supra text accompanying notes 65-68)).
278. Smith, 344 U.S. at 570.
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doubts. " 9 Rather, it contended, "the accused in this case was
deprived of a fair opportunity to establish his insanity."'
Thus, all the Justices were in accord that-accepting
Smith's legal proposition that an insane person could not be
executed~k -the constitutional question was not whether
Pennsylvania had resolved the factual issue of insanity correctly,
but only whether Smith had been provided with a fair process
for its resolution. 2 And that, all agreed, could properly be decided summarily.
Fortunately for Smith as well as for the interests of justice,
within days after the Supreme Court's ruling, the Pennsylvania
courts ordered an inquiry into Smith's sanity, which eventuated
in a ruling that he was insane.'
279. Id. at 571 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 572. Neither Justice Frankfurter nor any of the others mentioned that the incumbent Philadelphia District Attorney, repudiating the views of his predecessor, had
filed a brief on behalf of the prisoner. Endorsing the dissent in the court of appeals,
see supra text accompanying note 70, this urged:
It is clear from the record, that the issues of fact raised by the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus have not been determined either by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania or by the United States District Court. Since substantial issues of Federal constitutional law are raised, it was incumbent on the
District Court to determine the facts....
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that for the reasons contained in
the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Biggs the judgment should be reversed
and the cause remanded with instructions to the District Court to make findings of fact necessary for the proper determination of the Federal questions involved.
Brief of the District Attorney for the City and County of Philadelphia at 3, Smith v.
Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953) (No. 31). See Earl Selby, Dilworth Will Intercede in High
Court for Killer, PHILADELPHIA EvE. BULL., Apr. 16, 1952, at 1 (describing
prosecutor's decision as "an action believed to be almost without precedent" and
detailing issues in case). This brief was filed for its persuasive effect only, since the
litigation on the government's side was conducted by the Attorney General of Pennsylvania.
Rather, as a separate and conclusive reason "why this Court should not affirm
the judgment below," Justice Frankfurter highlighted an affidavit presented to the
Court informing it that, subsequent to the rulings below, the government's witness
on Smith's insanity "had himself been committed . . . because of an incurable mental disease which had deprived him of 'any judgment or insight.'" Smith, 344 U.S. at
572 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
281. This presented no difficulty in the case at hand because Pennsylvania law
so provided, Smith, 344 U.S. at 568-69, 571, and thus it was not necessary to rule
whether the Constitution so required.
282. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986).
283. 1951 Mental Health Act Applies to Prisoner Awaiting Execution, [Philadel-
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III. THE PRE-BATOR CONTEXT OF BROWN V. ALLEN
None of the developments, judicial or legislative, that followed upon the release of the decision support the view that it
significantly re-shaped the legal landscape. Nor did any of the
contemporary antagonists over the appropriate scope of habeas
corpus view it as having done so. Prior to the appearance of
Bator's article,' Brown was just another, not particularly
prominent, episode in an ongoing contest that had begun long
before and continues to this day. Indeed, to the extent it had any
immediate impact at all, Brown seems to have increased the
rate at which federal habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners
were summarily denied.
A. Pre-Brown Background
The perceived intrusion on state criminal processes caused
by federal habeas corpus review had long been the subject of
complaint in certain quarters. 5
phia] LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 24, 1953, at 1 (reprinting ruling and sanity commission report on which it was based). The question at this point was present competency to be executed, not whether Smith had been sane at the time of the crime

or his guilty plea, but the findings cast strong doubt on the earlier determinations.
See Michael von Moschzisker, An Old Murder Case Returns to the Courts, PHILADELPHIA EvE. BULL., June 18, 1968, at 68. ("Technically [the commission] was to determine the condition of the man five years after the crime, but the real effect was to
recheck the original diagnosis of the court psychiatrist, who had been found to be
not well himself"); Earl Selby, Insanity Ruling Saves Life of Cabbie's Killer, PHILADELPHIA EvE. BULL., Mar. 23, 1953, at 1 (publishing Smith's diagram of a "supernatural efficacious transmitter" that, by shooting out a "telepathic electro-magnetic
beam," prevented his mind from "rotating normally," thereby causing his troubles).
Eventually, in 1968, Smith was determined to be sane-and thus potentially subject
to execution-at which point the Governor commuted his sentence to life imprisonment. See Shafer Commutes Slayer's Sentence, PHILADELPHIA EvE. BULL., Nov. 19,
1968, at 35. The Pennsylvania Board of Pardons reviewed the case in February,
1973 and, relying upon Smith's "excellent conduct record" in prison and the absence
of any psychiatric symptoms, recommended that he be paroled as of September,
1974-a recommendation that the Governor approved. In re Application of Smith,
No. 9994 (Pa. Bd. Pardons, Feb. Sess. 1973).
284. Bator, supra note 8.
285. The short discussion that follows does not purport to be a complete account
of the tangled maneuverings over habeas corpus from the early 1940s through the
late 1960s, but merely an effort to locate Brown within that debate. For a more
extensive discussion of the history, see Yackle, supra note 218, at 2341-48. In addi-
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Thus, for example, Judge Parker-who sat on the Fourth
Circuit panel reviewing the North Carolina cases that were
decided in Brown"--had chaired a committee of the Judicial
Conference that in 1943 persuaded that body to support a statute denying federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to state prisoners
for as long as they had state collateral remedies available. 7

tion, the subject was thoroughly canvassed in a number of scholarly amicus briefs
filed on behalf of the prisoner (the Supreme Court respondent) in Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277 (1992) (No. 91-542). See Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief Amici
Curiae of Benjamin R. Civiletti, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Edward H. Levi, Elliot L.
Richardson et al. in Support of the Respondent, Wright (No. 91-542) (authored by
James S. Liebman et al.); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union
and the ACLU of Virginia in Support of Respondent, id.; Brief of the States of New
York and Ohio Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent on the Issue of De Novo
Review, id.; Brief for Senator Biden and Representative Edwards as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent, id.; Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amici Curiae on
Behalf of [Law Professors Including] Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland . . . and
Herbert Wechsler, id. (authored by Larry W. Yackle). See generally Brief of the
American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Wright (No.
91-542) (authored by Seth P. Waxman, et al.).
286. See supra note 93.
After an active career in Republican politics and five years on the Fourth
Circuit, see Harry E. Watkins, A Great Judge and a Great American: Chief Judge
John J. Parker, 1885-1958, 44 A.B.A J. 448 (1958), Judge Parker had been nominated to the Supreme Court in 1930, but was rejected by the Senate on a 41-39
vote after opposition from labor unions and the NAACP. See Confirmation of Hon.
John J. Parker to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930); John Parker Dies; Federal Judge, 72, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1958, at 29. He remained a possible candidate for the Court, however, see DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES 22-25 (1999) (describing Truman

Administration consideration of Parker in 1945); A Tribute to Judge John J. Parker-'The Gladsome Light of Jurisprudence", 37 N.C. L. REv. 1, 14 (reprinting remarks of Judge Orie L. Phillips of the Tenth Circuit, who served with Parker on
Judicial Conference habeas corpus committees and was himself considered for the
Court). In particular, after the sudden death of Chief Justice Vinson in September,
1953, see Chief Justice Vinson Dies of Heart Attack in Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
1953, at 1, "he was mentioned for the vacant post . .. , but by that time he was
nearly 68 years old and President Eisenhower chose a younger man-Earl Warren,"
Judge Parker Dies, supra; see YALOF, supra, at 44-51 (describing Warren nomination).
287. See REPORT OF THE [1943] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES
22-25 (1944); REPORT OF THE [1945] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDG-

ES 18 (1946); John W. Winkle, III, Judges as Lobbyists: Habeas Corpus Reform in
the 1940s, 68 JUDICATURE 263, 266-67, 272 (1985). As noted supra text accompany-

ing notes 141-45, in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447-50 (1953), the Court unanimously rejected Judge Parker's argument that the 1948 revisions to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 embodied this rule. Cf. infra note 336 (noting Justices' concern during 1940s
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Similarly, as the Brown opinions note,2 s the assembled
state chief justices had in the fall of 1952 resolved that "a final
judgment of a State's highest court [should] be subject to review
or reversal only by the Supreme Court of the United States." 9
The source of the problem was generally identified as Moore,
if not Frank.290
B. Post-Brown Developments
In the aftermath of Brown, the opponents of generous habeas corpus review considered it one more example of their complaints, 29 1 but not as a sea change in the law. Thus, when Attorney General Herbert Brownell spoke to the Judicial Conference following the decision, he suggested that Brown had corwith the inadequacy of state collateral remedies in Illinois).
In 1952, the Judicial Conference considered and rejected supporting a statutory amendment that would have barred state prisoners from successive federal
habeas corpus applications. See REPORT OF THE [1952] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 223-24 (1953).
288. 344 U.S. 443, 451 n.5 (1953) (opinion of the Court); Brown, 344 U.S. at 539
& n.13 (Jackson, J., concurring in the result).
289. Id. at 539 n.13 (setting forth text of resolution).
290. See, e.g., id. at 533 n.4 (Jackson, J., concurring in the result) (noting both
cases).
291. For instance, Judge Parker, testifying in June, 1955 in support of H.R. 5649,
see infra note 292 (describing bill), referred to Brown critically but as a typical example of long-subsisting abuses. See Habeas Corpus: Hearings on H.R. 5649 Before
the Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. at
10-11 (1955).
Similarly, the habeas corpus committee of the conference of state chief justices
in its June, 1953 report included as part of a lengthy appendix a description of the
case provided by the Chief Justice of North Carolina, who suggested that the protracted federal review of Speller's case, see supra text accompanying notes 101-05,
derogated from "the rights of the state and the public to the speedy administration
of justice." REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON HABEAS CORPUS TO THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, at App. 10 (June 1953). There is a copy in the Robert H.
Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, Box 120, Habeas Corpus file.
Prior to Bator, supra note 8, other aspects of Brown were at least as salient.
The press was interested because of the unusual format of the decision, see supra
text accompanying notes 4-5, and because of the substantive issue of jury discrimination in North Carolina, see Huston, supra note 4. The Justices needed to put the
cases down for reargument, see supra text accompanying notes 139-40, because they
saw the major and time-consuming task before them as resolving the issue-on
which the lower courts had split, see supra text accompanying notes 41-44, and on
which they eventually did as well, see supra text accompanying note 256-of the
weight to be given on habeas corpus to a prior certiorari denial.
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rectly decided "that the practice which permits State prisoners
to apply to the lower Federal courts for relief by habeas corpus
is required by the present habeas corpus statute, in particular,
28 U.S.C. 2254," and outlined various possible statutory changes.'

292. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 40 (1953).
Brownell noted that a committee of the state chief justices' conference had recommended a system under which a state prisoner could pursue federal habeas corpus
in the district court only if the Supreme Court so authorized in passing on his or
her certiorari application on direct appeal, cf. supra text accompanying notes 236-37
(quoting similar suggestion by clerk Rehnquist), but that the entire body had not
adopted this, preferring instead its earlier proposal, see supra text accompanying
note 289, under which only the Supreme Court could nullify state criminal convictions.
He continued,
Still another form of statutory amendment might be the proposal implicit in
Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring views in Brown v. Allen. This would exclude
lower court entertainment of a petition unless the state law allowed no access
to its courts on the constitutional points raised; or the petition showed that,
although the law allows a remedy, the petitioner was improperly obstructed
from making a record . . . I mention these several suggestions for Federal
action because it seems to me this is a problem for the Judicial Conference in
the first instance.
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 40-41. Cf.
supra text accompanying note 287 (noting that the Judicial Conference had previously endorsed legislation to this effect).
In response to these remarks, the Conference re-activated its habeas corpus
committee under Judge Parker. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, supra, at 26. In September, 1954, the committee proposed that a
subsection be added to 28 U.S.C. §. 2254 providing that habeas corpus applications
by state prisoners might be entertained:
only on a ground which presents a substantial Federal constitutional question
(1) which was not theretofore raised and determined (2) which there was no
fair and adequate opportunity theretofore to raise and have determined and
(3) which cannot thereafter be raised and determined in a proceeding in the
State court, by an order or judgment subject to review by the Supreme Court
of the United States on writ of certiorari.
An order denying an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person
in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court shall be reviewable only
on writ of certiorari [and the] petition for the writ of certiorari shall be filed
within 30 days.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES 22-23 (1955). The committee reported in 1955 that the proposal had received
the concurrence of most of the judges who had responded to a request for the expression of views, as well as of various other legal groups, and had been introduced
in the House of Representatives as H.R. 5649, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). See
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES 23, 79, 272 (1956). As the committee reported in 1956, this legislation eventually passed the House but not the Senate. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 34 (1957); infra text accompanying notes 300-
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But there is no evidence that anyone before Bator considered Brown to have worked a revolutionary broadening of the
writ. And for good reason. In the aftermath of the decision, the
percentage of petitions disposed of without hearings increased,293 and Justice Frankfurter, at least, thought there was
a causal connection.2 94
But Justice Frankfurter did not attack this effect. 5 Rather, as he had in the past,2" he identified as the central holding
of the case its rejection of any substantive effect to the denial of
certiorari and stressed the importance of this in structural
terms:
[O]n the basis of... practical considerations.

.

. Brown v.

01.
293. See infra App. 2.
294. The legislation that bad previously passed the House, see supra note 292,
was re-introduced in the 85th Congress and designated H.R. 8361. See H.R. REP.
No. 1293, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1958). Chief Justice Warren asked Justices
Frankfurter, Clark and Harlan to serve as a committee to consider it. See Letter
from Felix Frankfurter to Tom Clark and John Harlan (Sept. 29, 1958), Felix Frankfurter Papers, supra note 14, Part III, Reel 6, Frame 728.
Justice Frankfurter thereupon wrote a Memorandum for the Committee on
Proposed Habeas Corpus Legislation (Nov. 3, 1958), a copy of which is to be found
at id., Part III, Reel 6, Frame 422. He observed:
In applying Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 the district courts may, barring a
serious infirmity in state-court proceedings, rely on the state court record in
passing on a federal habeas corpus application. The practical result of this
utilization of Brown v. Allen is that all but a small percentage of such applications are denied upon the moving papers. During the last three available
years, district courts held factual hearings on only 76 of 2,192 applications.
[3.5%]
Id. at 3.
295. Indeed, he embraced it as showing that restrictive legislation was unnecessary. The sentence immediately following the last one quoted supra note 294 is:
"According to a study by the Administrative Office, only .004 percent of district court
time is devoted to state habeas corpus cases."
Moreover, to help head off restrictive legislation, Justice Frankfurter was willing to make the Brown rule "explicit by statute" so that "the District Court would
be authorized to order a hearing on a state prisoner's habeas corpus application only
in a case where the record of the state proceedings were found to be an inadequate
basis for determining the merit of the constitutional claim." Id. at 7-8.
296. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Sherman Minton (May 28, 1954) ("In
Brown v. Allen the Court decided that the lower federal courts must not draw any
inference of unsubstantiality from denial of certiorari. That decision was reached
after as thorough consideration as any question that has been before the Court since
you and I have been on it. . . . Nor is this rule merely technical."). There is a copy
in the Felix Frankfurter Papers, supra note 14, Part III, Reel 2, Frame 441.
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Allen finally established that denial of certiorari by this Court in
these habeas corpus cases implied no decision whatever on the
merits of the case. At present about 350 of such petitions come
before us per Term. Apart from all else-that is, without regard
to the demands of the other cases that come before the Court-we
could not possibly dispose of so many cases on the merits nor
would we have the facilities, time apart, to examine and ascertain
the too-often hidden facts in these cases. At present, the Court
can conscientiously deny certiorari... with the knowledge that a
prisoner is free after our denial to seek habeas corpus in a forum
equipped to ascertain the facts, i.e., the district court.
The proposed measure would make certiorari the final and,
for all practical purposes, exclusive federal method for review of a
state prisoner's claim under the United States Constitution. A
denial of certiorari would become a definitive disposition of the
federal constitutional claim. But for the reasons indicated, this
Court could not, and therefore would not, base such a final decision on the unsatisfactory records now available here... [and]
would be confronted with the necessity of establishing new, appropriate procedures to assure a responsible adjudication on the
merits of constitutional claims....
[T]he initial and final sifting of habeas corpus claims by the
federal 7judiciary most certainly is not the function of this
Court.2

This view proved persuasive. Although only Chief Judge
Denman of the Ninth Circuit298 and Chief Judge Jerome N.
Frank of the Second Circuit had raised the problem initially,2'

297. Memorandum, supra note 294, at 5-6. The problem of the distribution of
business between the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts had been of concern to Frankfurter since the mid-1920's. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering
the FrankfurterianParadigm:Reflections on Histories of the Lower Federal Courts, 24
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 679 (1999) (analyzing FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES L. LANDIs,
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928)).
298. Denman, "a New Deal Democrat [who] maintained a consistently liberal, and
sometimes controversial," role on the bench, see Coast Ex-Jurist Reported Suicide,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 10, 1959, at 29, and who had written the Ninth Circuit's opinion
in Ekberg, see supra text accompanying notes 81-82, was a frequent adversary of
Judge Parker's on habeas matters in judicial and legislative fora, both before and
after Brown. See, e.g., Letter from John J. Parker to William Denman (May 16,
1956) (defending H.R. 5649, 84th Cong., 1" Sess. (1955), against objections raised by
Denman; copied to Senate Judiciary Committee, Supreme Court, and Judicial Conference). There is a copy in the William 0. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box
583, Habeas Corpus Law folder.
299. See Letter from Jerome N. Frank to William 0. Douglas (Sept. 11, 1956).
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the Judicial Conference proposal of 1 9 5 5 "0 foundered in the
wake of this memorandum, when "several members of the Supreme Court" indicated that the bill "would unduly increase the
work of that Court," which "is not constituted to hear contested
applications for habeas corpus" and which would respond to such
legislation by referring petitions "to district judges sitting as
special masters.""1
Indeed, despite the drumbeat of criticism against federal
habeas corpus for state prisoners, "[nlone of the restrictive bills
was enacted into law";0 2 "the Court promptly rejected Professor Bator's thesis" in a trilogy of habeas corpus cases that "in
1963 confirmed Brown in the clearest of terms and, indeed, built
upon that decision in setting down guidelines for the exercise of
independent federal judgment on the merits of federal
claims";3 °3 and in 1966 "Congress enacted legislation that codified the essentials of Brown" in rejecting preclusive effects of
state court determinations. 3 °
In short, one can designate Brown as a revolutionary case
only by shutting one's eyes to the surrounding decades of historical context. The case was simply one episode in a long-running
struggle that was under way long before the case was decided
and continued little changed thereafter.

There is a copy in the William 0. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 583,
Habeas Corpus Law folder.
300. See supra note 292.
301.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE

UNITED SIATES [FOR 1959] 313 (1960).
302. Yackle, supra note 218, at 2347.
303. Id. (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963), and Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963)).
304. Id. at 2347-48 (citing 1966 revision of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). See LIEBMAN &
HERTZ, supra note 3, § 2.4d, at 64 (concluding that "the 1966 amendments either
confirmed or left intact what the caselaw had long established."). This, of course,
was not the end of the story. Like the combatants in World War I, succeeding
waves of warriors continued to do battle over the same narrow terrain-and are
doing so still. See Larry W. Yackle, Recent CongressionalAction on Federal Habeas
Corpus: a Primer, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996); see also Mark Tushnet & Larry
Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1,
37-47 (1997).
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IV. UNDERSTANDING BROWN V. ALLEN

Legally, Brown was an exceedingly minor event. On the
issue of the federal habeas courts' re-examination of state court
findings, its substantive standards were deferential in the extreme; its reaffirmation of independent federal review of legal
issues was unsurprising; and its procedural guidelines for when
hearings should be held proved ephemeral. The only enduring
law that the case made-rejecting any preclusive effect for certiorari denials-was so eminently sensible as to be
uncontroversial today."' 5
But the pragmatic effect of that legal ruling-that primary
responsibility for federal scrutiny of state criminal convictions
would rest with the district courts rather than the Supreme
Court-was to assure the real-world ability of the federal court
system to apply the applicable substantive standards, thereby
vindicating on the ground in the second half of the Twentieth
Century the promises of Frank and Moore in the first.3"6
To seek to grasp Brown as new law is to clutch at a ghost;
to understand it as the implementation of old law is to add a
modest but solid stone to the fabric of a cathedral.0 7
A. The Ghost
No evidence for the proposition that Brown inaugurated
some new and more intrusive level of federal scrutiny of state
court proceedings is to be found in the opinions themselves. "As
in other appeals, the scope of review was to be de novo on the

305. See 1 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 3, § 2.4d, at 68-69 ("The only
revolution' Brown worked, therefore, was one that seems so obvious today that we
can hardly imagine anyone having thought the law different-its holding that denial
of certiorari on direct review was not a ruling on the merits, hence could not serve
in lieu of review as of right on habeas corpus.").
Accepting this proposition, those seeking to narrow habeas review have sought
in more recent years to constrict the ability of habeas corpus petitioners to appeal
from the district courts to the circuit courts of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)
(1994 & Supp. II 1996); Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 256, 263-64 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming the Court is defying this provision).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
307. By his title to Yackle, supra note 218, Professor Yackle has anticipated me
in using the cathedral metaphor to characterize the habeas corpus edifice.
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law"30-and the Court did give plenary consideration to the
claims that the structure of the North Carolina jury selection
system and the procedures for sanity review in Pennsylvania
were unconstitutional-but "deferential on the facts,""°9 as it
most certainly was.1 0
In the Brown case itself, not even Justices Frankfurter and
Black were willing to assert that the district court should have
conducted an independent review of the circumstances of the
confession, " notwithstanding the grave suspicions raised by
those circumstances. '2 Similarly, no Justice was willing to reexamine the state courts' sanity findings in Smith, utterly wrong
though they were in fact.31 3 And two people whose constitutional rights had in all probability been denied 3" died in North
Carolina's gas chamber because the Daniels majority held that
unless it gave preclusive effect to the one-day lateness in filing
the appeals papers it "would subvert the entire system of state
criminal justice and destroy state energy in the detection and
punishment of crime."31 5
Just as any novel substantive aspects of Brown are chimerical, so did any novel procedural ones prove to be ephemeral. The
case's foggy and forgiving formulations as to when federal habeas courts were required to hold evidentiary hearings were replaced by more precise and demanding ones in Townsend v.
Sain,3 6 ones which were themselves replaced by equally pre-

308. LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 3, § 2.4d, at 62. See Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 458 (1953) (holding that federal habeas courts should give rulings of the
state courts on the constitutional law issues "the weight that federal practice gives
to the conclusion of a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on federal constitutional issues").
309. LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 3, § 2.4d, at 62.
310. Indeed, Bator could with equal plausibility (albeit no less erroneously, see
supra note 26 and accompanying text) have argued that Brown represented a return
to the appropriately deferential standard of Frank and a repudiation of Moore. See
Freedman, supra note 22, at 1530-32 (discussing Bator's views of relationship between Frank and Moore).
311. See supra note 262.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
313. See supra note 283.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
315. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485 (1953). Cf. William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners:An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV.
423, 430-32, 437-38, 441-42 (1961) (attacking this outcome).
316. 372 U.S. 293, 312-19 (1963) (announcing "[t]he appropriate standard-which
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cise but deferential ones in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes. 17 The ruling in Daniels precluding review due to a day's tardiness in the
filing of an appeal was repudiated in Fay v. Noia, 18 but revived in Coleman v. Thompson."'9
To attack Brown as a novelty that changed the direction of
habeas corpus law is to spear a cloud:
B. The Cathedral
For those who do not believe in ghosts, there is a much
more sensible approach, one which views the basic contours of
habeas corpus law as a legal cathedral built up over many generations by workers who have often been at odds on points of
decoration but have had a common understanding of the fundamental plan.
As I have recently described in detail, 20 the government in
Frank argued that the petitioner was precluded from federal habeas corpus relief by the prior rejection of his claims by the state
courts and the Supreme Court's subsequent refusal to grant
writs of error. The Court rejected both positions 2 ' and held
that the district court had the power to hold a hearing to investigate the petitioner's claims of constitutional error during the
state proceedings." 2
must be considered to supersede, to the extent of any inconsistencies, the opinions
in Brown v. Allen").
317. 504 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1992) (overruling Townsend). In 1996, Congress created its
own statutory standards for mandatory, but not discretionary, hearings. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (eX2) (1994 & Supp. II 1996); Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 408, 417 n.2
(2d Cir. 1997); see also Burris v. Parke, 116 F.3d 256, 258-59 (7th Cir. 1997); Jones
v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1113 (9th Cir. 1997).
318. 372 U.S. 391, 425-26, 433-35 (1963) (Brennan, J.) (granting habeas relief to
an applicant who had filed no state appeal at all). As indicated supra note 39, the
same case also took the step that the Brown Court had been unwilling to take and
overruled Darr. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 435-38.
319. 501 U.S. 722, 749-51 (1991) (holding habeas relief precluded by three-day
lateness in filing appeal from denial of state post-conviction remedies). See Eric M.
Freedman, Habeas Corpus Cases Re-Wrote the Doctrine, NATL. L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at
S6 (criticizing decision's repudiation of Fay); see also Freedman, supra, note 227, at
557 n.63 (criticizing the decision's historically inaccurate view of federalism). Cf.
Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (holding habeas relief precluded by failure
to file a petition for discretionary review of conviction by state Supreme Court).
320. Freedman, supra note 22, at 1490.
321. See id. at 1491.
322. The Frank majority upheld the district court's exercise of discretion to de-
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The government made precisely the same set of arguments
in Moore." They were again rejected, and without the articulation of any new legal standards, the Court held that the District Judge had been required to hold a hearing. 2 4
Thus, by the time of Darr v. Burford,3 2 it was well-established that neither the prior merits rulings of the state courts
nor the failure of the Supreme Court to review them would preclude federal habeas review. And it was equally clear that the
front line of such review was the district court, which had some
discretion--one whose contours were as yet undefined--over
whether or not to hold a hearing to exercise its undoubted power
to consider whether the state proceedings had been infected by
fundamental error. 6
Darr, however, created doctrinal confusion32 7 and a potential practical problem. Doctrinally, the requirement that state
prisoners file a certiorari petition raised the question of whether,
Frank and Moore notwithstanding, some substantive significance
should be given to the petition's denial. And, as a practical matter, if this were to happen, the task of reviewing state convictions for constitutional error-under whatever standard might
be applicable-would fall on the Supreme Court, not the district
courts, necessarily circumscribing such review radically. As already indicated, all those involved in Brown clearly saw these
problems and clearly saw the legal ruling it made-to reject any
preclusive effect for the denial of certiorari-as solving them."
Brown thus restored the legal and practical status quo ante

cline to hold such a hearing, while the dissent would have required one. See id. at
1492-94.
323. See id. at 1523.
324. See id. at 1529. Rather than go through with such a hearing, the parties
negotiated the petitioners' release, thereby freeing men who had come within days of
execution. See id. at 1512-13, 1529-30.
325. 339 U.S. 200 (1950) (described supra Part I.A.1).
326. See Freedman, supra note 22, at 1532-34; see also supra note 238 (recording
a similar understanding of Justice Frankfurter).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44. An alternative view would be that
Darr did not itself create the confusion, but rather was the bit of fuel that caused
to leap into flames the confusion that had previously been smoldering. See LIEBMAN
& HERTZ, supra note 3, §2.4d, at 67; see also Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal
Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 317 (1993); Bator, supra note 8, at 496-98; supra
note 93.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35, 224, 257, 296-301.

2000]

Habeas Milestones-Brown v. Allen

1621

that Darrhad threatened. This-not more and not less-is what
the case did, and it should define the niche it appropriately
occupies in the habeas edifice.
C. The Ghost in the Cathedral
The attempt to find in Brown what is not there surely owes
much to now Chief Justice Rehnquist, whether one attributes it
to a desire common among law clerks to believe that cases in
which they participated were of special importance, an exaggeration of the extent to which his views were ultimately shared
either by Justice Jackson or by the Court, to intellectual sympathy with Bator,3" or to a more ideological distaste with the
fact that Brown did buttress federal habeas corpus as a practical
remedy."0 Then, too, the phenomenon that other Justices can
also see the ghost 31 demonstrates the influence a Harvard
Law professor can have on others' perceptions of empirical reality by publishing an article in the HarvardLaw Review.
But there is no ghost. Nothing about Brown was revolutionary.
V. CONCLUSION

The theory that independent federal habeas corpus review of
the constitutional validity of state criminal convictions is a modern innovation attributable to Brown is simply inconsistent with
the historical evidence.

329. The fact that some parts of Professor Bator's argument were so clearly in
tune with clerk Rehnquist's thinking, see supra notes 222, 229, doubtless made Chief
Justice Rehnquist readier to believe the parts relating to the importance of Brown.
330. See Steiker, supra note 327, at 319 (observing that Brown remains important because, although "as a theoretical matter," it was "simply a codification of preBrown habeas law," it eventually led in practice to more habeas relief); supra note

20.
331.

See supra notes 9, 28.
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FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY
STATE PRISONERS 1941-1960

1.
Fiscal

2.
Cases

3.
State

Year

Filed33

Prisoners334

1941
1942
1943
1944

127
130
269

146,974
133,761
121,107
114,317

605336

4.
Filing
335
Rate

.864
.972
2.22
5.29

332. This Appendix is designed to provide some empirical perspective on two
issues: (a) the gross number of cases filed during the period, which is relevant to
the Supreme Court's institutional ability to process them and (b) the rate of filings
relative to the total number of state prisoners, which is relevant to the claims of
habeas corpus opponents that the federal courts were being flooded with such applications.
333. The figures are taken from ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1960 116 (1961).
334. The figures are taken from PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, YEAREND 1925-86, at 7-10

(1988).
335. This figure, designed to create an index of the frequency of claims, is simply
the number in Column 2 divided by the number in Column 3 and multiplied by
1000.
336.

See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1950, at 113 (1950) ("Until recently the courts of Illinois did not provide [hearings comporting with due process], and as a result 342
Federal question habeas corpus suits were brought in the Northern District of Illinois in 1944 and 238 in 1947."). If all 342 of the 1944 cases were subtracted, then
the figure in Column 1 would be 263, and that in Column 4 would be 2.30.
The background of the Illinois situation is to be found in an illuminating
report drafted for the Habeas Corpus Committee of the Chicago Bar Association in
October, 1947 by Dean Wilber G. Katz of the University of Chicago Law School:
In April 1945, when White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 [(1945)], was argued in
the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Stone and other members of
the Court vigorously expressed their concern over the hundreds of Illinois
criminal cases on their docket. Similar concern was expressed a year later at
the argument of Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 [(1946)]. . . . In November 1946 at the argument of Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 [(1946)], Mr. Justice Frankfurter pressed counsel for the petitioner . . . as to what is wrong
with the jurisprudence of Illinois that the United States Supreme Court
should be flooded with petitions from Illinois prisoners.

2000]

Habeas Milestones-Brown v. Allen

1.
Fiscal
Year

2.
Cases
Filed

3.
State
Prisoners

4.
Filing
Rate

1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

536
492
485
543
584
560
482
541
548
597
660
734
778
755
822
871

115,011
122,457
134,158
139,649
146,881
149,031
148,285
150,219
154,216
162,898
165,692
169,431
174,836
184,094
185,613
189,735

4.66
4.01
3.61
3.89
3.98
3.76
3.26
3.60
3.55
3.66
3.98
4.33
4.45
4.10
4.43
4.59

1623

After quoting the ruling in Carter, 329 U.S. at 175, that a state must give a prisoner an opportunity to litigate fundamental errors not appearing on the record, the
report continued: "Hundreds of attempts have been made to secure such hearings in
Illinois but not a single case has come to the attention of the committee in which a
prisoner has had in a state court an opportunity to prove his allegations," a situation it attributed to labyrinthine statutory procedures administered by unsympathetic
courts and government attorneys. CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION, DRAFT REPORT OF
COMMITTEE ON HABEAS CORPus 1-2, 8-11 (Oct. 30, 1947). Dean Katz sent a copy of
this report to Justice Frankfurter under cover of a letter dated November 3, 1947,
and both documents are to be found in the Frankfurter Papers, supra note 14, Part
III, Reel 6, Frames 845-59.
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Appendix 2
EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS BY DISTRICT COURTS ON HABEAS
337
CORPUS APPLICATIONS

Fiscal
Year
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957

% Disposed of
After Hearing
11.9
24.6
9.1
2.9
4.3
6.5
10.4
11.3
8.4
10.0
6.2
4.9
5.5
3.3
3.7
2.7
3.4

337. The figures are taken from S. REP. No. 85-2228, at 30 (1958) (to accompany
H.R. 85-8361).

